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Article 5

THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
EMILY SUSKI*
This Article compares the liability of the public schools with that
of families for harms to children in their care. Families serve as
an apt vehicle for comparative analysis because families’ and
schools’ responsibilities for children overlap substantially. Despite these overlapping responsibilities, however, the law allows
schools to evade liability for harms to children and penalizes families for the same or similar harms.
Drawing on feminist theory on privacy and the public/private divide, this Article argues that the limits of public school liability
mean they have privacy. Feminist theorists identify privacy as
freedom from regulation and intrusion into decision-making. Public schools enjoy privacy in this sense because when they allow or
cause harm to children, they are largely not held legally responsible. In the context of harms to children, therefore, the public/private divide is inverted.
Recognizing this public school privacy has significance in three
ways. First, it highlights how the law privileges school authority
over the rights of children. Second, recognizing public schools’
privacy allows for its deconstruction. Third, once deconstructed,
elements of this privacy justify a theoretical argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on schools to protect children, and that children have a corollary right to be free from harm
in school.
INTRODUCTION
If time is the measure of responsibility, then the institutions with the
most responsibility for children are families and schools. Yet, when children
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are harmed in their care, the law holds schools far less responsible than families. Two recent cases illustrate this difference. In one, In re L.Z.,1 a mother
lost custody of her son for injuries inflicted by his aunt.2 Those injuries included bruises to his cheeks due to having an “adult planting a thumb in one
cheek [and her other fingers on the other cheek] and squeezing the child’s
face between the thumb and fingers.”3 In the other, Domingo v. Kowalski,4 a
child was subjected to virtually identical treatment.5 There, though, the adult
inflicting the injury was a school teacher, and the court excused the force as
“minimal,”6 “related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose,”7 and “resulting in
no demonstrated serious injury.”8 As a result, the school faced no responsibility for the harm to the child.9
These cases reflect an inversion of the public/private binary.10 The public/private binary has been extensively explored in feminist literature.11
1. 111 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2015).
2. Id. at 1186.
3. Id. at 1167.
4. 810 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016).
5. Id. at 407–08.
6. Id. at 414.
7. Id. at 412.
8. Id. at 416. As reflected by the number of cases heard in the federal courts of appeals alone,
harm to children in school happens with some degree of frequency, not to mention claims heard in
federal district and state courts about such harms. Indeed, at least seven federal courts of appeals
have considered cases involving harms to children to decide just the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty of care for students on schools. See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
9. Domingo, 810 F.3d at 416. The comparison also raises the question of whether the child
welfare system too easily imposes liability on families and what should be done about that. Resolving that question is beyond the scope of this Article and indeed has been thoughtfully explored by
other scholars. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children:
The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
413 (2005); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child Welfare, 92 NEB.
L. REV. 897, 916 (2014).
10. For example, and perhaps most prominently, Catharine MacKinnon has critiqued the public/private divide and notions of privacy generally, and family privacy in particular, as the marker
of women’s subordination and oppression. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 191–92 (1989); see also Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322–23 (1993) (exploring
meanings of “public” and “private” and assessing the criticisms of them). Anne C. Dailey has also
described the ways regulation of the family flout notions of family privacy. Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 997–99 (1993). Martha Albertson
Fineman has critiqued the concept of family privacy as one that relegates caretaking, which she sees
as a collective responsibility to a particular, and at least sometimes problematic, sphere. MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 292, 299 (2004). As
a result of this work and the work of others, Katharine Bartlett describes “[f]eminist successes in
achieving reform [particularly] in the area [of domestic violence as] quite impressive.” Katharine
T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 495 (1999).
11. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 835 (1985) (arguing that the myth of “the private family is an incoherent ideal and that the
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There, “public” is identified as that which is regulated, particularly by the
government.12 “Private” is the opposite.13 It is unregulated and free from
intrusion.14 In that sense, families have long been considered private.15 Absent maltreatment, families have had a great deal of freedom to care for children as they see fit.16 Indeed, caretaking itself has been deemed private in
that it has been seen as properly the role of families and not the state.17 Families, thus, undertake private tasks and have privacy in doing so. In contrast,
public schools have understandably been considered wholly public. They are
not just regulated by the state.18 They are creatures of it.19
At the same time, though, the notion that there is a stark, impregnable
divide between the public and private spheres has been exposed as false, particularly with respect to the family.20 Families are very much regulated.21
Mandatory school attendance laws require that families send their children to
school.22 Family leave laws determine how much time employees can take
away from work to care for family members.23 These and other laws, therefore, demonstrate that families’ authority over the care of children is not unfettered. What has not yet been explored, however, is the extent to which the
public/private binary founders because public entities have some degree of
privacy.24 This Article explores that question with respect to the public
schools.
rhetoric of nonintervention is more harmful than helpful”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence
of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974, 984–86 (1991) (exploring the problems of notions of privacy, including its contribution to the oppression of women, and also the value in affirmative notions of privacy).
12. See infra notes 318–321 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 318–323 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 318–323 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 327–332 and accompanying text.
16. MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS 120 (2010) (“[I]t is families, not the state, who are responsible for safeguarding
children’s welfare.”).
17. Id.; see infra notes 331–332 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 378–380 and accompanying text.
19. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (identifying boards of
education as “creatures” of the state); see also Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446,
457–58 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (“School districts are creatures of state law established to carry out
governmental functions . . . .”).
20. As Katharine Bartlett writes, “[f]eminism’s principal contribution to the law of the family
in the United States has been to open up that institution to critical scrutiny and question the justice
of a legal regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some family members to
others.” Bartlett, supra note 10, at 475.
21. See infra notes 347–348 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
24. One particularly notable exception to the public nature of public institutions is the state
secrets privilege and other information held by the government but shielded from public knowledge
out of national security and other concerns. For example, in United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme
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This Article argues that the public/private binary fails with respect to
the public schools. In the context of responsibility for harm to children, the
public schools have privacy—more than even the family—and the privacy is
evidenced in two primary ways. First, public schools do the caretaking work
traditionally relegated to the private sphere. For reasons both practical and
legal, public schools and families share nearly identical caretaking responsibilities over children.25 Children—particularly young children—cannot ensure their own safety or impose their own discipline. They need families and,
when they are in school, schools to do that for them. The law has recognized
this point.26 Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified these roles for both
families and schools, and it has used them to justify its decisions.27 The Court
has said that both families and schools educate students for citizenship, socialize them to morals and values, discipline them, and keep them safe.28 Because these responsibilities have traditionally been deemed primarily the
function of the family and not the state, they have been considered private.29
Schools, therefore, have a role to play in carrying out activities traditionally
deemed private.
Second, public schools have privacy because the law limits their liability when children are harmed in their care. Indeed, the law holds the public
schools less responsible than the family for such harms. Although child
abuse and neglect laws have created a system for imposing responsibility on
the family when children are harmed, no such system exists for the schools.30
Instead, when children suffer harms in school, they face an uphill battle to
hold the school responsible. Children injured in school could theoretically
make out a substantive due process claim or a Title IX harassment claim, to

Court concluded that the United States properly invoked its state secrets privilege in response to a
request for an accident report by three widows whose husbands had died as the result of a military
aircraft crash. 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). The federal Freedom of Information Act serves as another
example. It has nine enumerated categories of information that are exempt from disclosure. 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). Even in these examples, though, privacy is not the conceptualization applied to withholding that information from the public. Instead, the information is treated as exceptional—secret, even—but not private.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See infra Part I.B.
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. To be sure, the Supreme Court never calls the work of schools “caretaking” or “private.”
It nonetheless is such in the sense that it is the work generally relegated to the private sphere. So,
even when the Supreme Court has found the state to have some caretaking obligation, it has been
the exception to the norm. It has been justified only when the state has prevented individuals from
caring for themselves, as in the case of prison inmates or persons involuntarily committed to mental
health facilities. See infra notes 382–383 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part III.B.
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name two. Those claims, however, are not easy to establish.31 The threshold
legal standards and the facts that must be alleged to support them serve as
high bars to success.32 The public schools, therefore, enjoy privacy in the
sense that they enjoy freedom from regulation or intrusion into decisionmaking that allows or causes harm to children.33
This comparison between the child welfare system and claims against
schools is made not to suggest that a child-welfare-like system be developed
for adjudicating claims of harm to children in school. That such a system
exists for claims against the family when claims against the public schools
are fraught with barriers to success, however, does reflect the relative willingness of the legal system to hold these two institutions responsible for
harms to children. The law stands far more ready to hold the family responsible for harms to children than schools.
Exposing this privacy of the public schools has value in three ways.
First, it highlights how the law privileges school authority over children’s
rights and therefore leaves children vulnerable to harm.34 Second, recognition of public schools’ privacy allows for its deconstruction.35 Third, once
deconstructed, elements of this privacy support a theoretical argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on schools to protect children.36
This Article, therefore, contributes to the scholarly discourse on public school
liability and children’s rights by offering a way to hold schools more accountable for harms to children.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains more fully how, under the jurisprudence touching on the roles of the family and the public
schools, the roles of both institutions are markedly similar and can be
summed up as caretaking roles.37 While these similarities might suggest that

31. A child abuse case against an individual school staff member for harms to a child might
succeed, but a claim against the public school itself is far more challenging to establish. For example, in T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County, a child abused by his teacher in
school lodged an unsuccessful claim against the public schools to hold them accountable for his
harms, but the teacher was separately charged with and found guilty of criminal child abuse. 610
F.3d 588, 597 (11th Cir. 2010).
32. See infra Part III.B–C.
33. This is not to say that public schools are not regulated at all and are therefore totally private.
They are regulated in numerous ways, just largely not when it comes to harms to children in school.
See infra notes 364–367 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part III.B.2.
35. See infra Part IV.A.
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. Martha Fineman discusses this kind of caretaking more broadly as meeting dependency
needs, or the needs of those “not autonomous and independent” in arguing that there is a collective
responsibility for meeting those needs. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at xiii. Maxine Eichner has also
argued the state should play a greater role in supporting caretaking, though she alternately calls
these needs caretaking and dependency needs. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 9–10.
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the two institutions share similar degrees of responsibility for harms to children in their care, Part II demonstrates that is not the case. In analyzing child
welfare laws and cases, it describes the ease with which responsibility is imposed on families for harms to children. It then compares this level of responsibility to that of the public schools by discussing some of the principal
claims a child could make against the public schools for harms suffered in
school. This discussion shows how limited public school responsibility is.
Part III argues that this limited responsibility means that public schools have
privacy. It first mines feminist theory on the concept of privacy to explain
how it operates generally. It then applies these concepts of privacy to the
public schools to show how they enjoy it to a greater degree than families.38
The consequence of this privacy is that school authority is privileged over
student rights. Finally, Part IV contends that dismantling the myth that public
schools are fully public offers a way to correct the privileging of school authority over children’s rights. Deconstructing public schools’ privacy into its
component parts reveals how some aspects of that privacy support a theoretical argument for the development of a school’s constitutional duty to protect
children from harm and an affirmative right of children to be free from that
harm in school. Part V also offers a framework for courts to consider in
evaluating this duty and this right.
I. THE OVERLAPPING ROLES OF THE FAMILY AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The two institutions with the greatest responsibility for the care of children over the course of their childhoods are families and schools.39 In part
38. This point gives rise to a separate, but closely related, question about why schools have
less responsibility than families for harms to children. Exploring this question will be the work of
a subsequent article. Both that article and this one fit within the framework of other research projects this Author has completed exploring the boundaries of public school authority and responsibility. See generally Emily Suski, A First Amendment Deference Approach to Reforming AntiBullying Laws, 77 LA. L. REV. 701 (2017); Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The
Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 63 (2014) [hereinafter Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates]; Emily F. Suski,
Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom: The Failure of the Courts to Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional
Harm as Unconstitutional, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125 (2014) [hereinafter Suski, Dark Sarcasm].
39. Students generally spend much of the day, five days per week for nine or more months of
the year, in school. All states require children attend school, and according to the Center for Public
Education, most states require students attend school for between 170 and 180 days per year for 900
to 1000 hours of instruction. Jim Hull & Mandy Newport, Time in School: How Does the U.S.
Compare?, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. (Dec. 2011), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/MainMenu/Organizing-a-school/Time-in-school-How-does-the-US-compare; Table 5.1. Compulsory
School Attendance Laws, Minimum and Maximum Age Limits for Required Free Education, by
State: 2015, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp
(last visited Jan 21, 2018) [hereinafter Table 5.1]. Of course there are interim places where children
also spend much of the day. As Laura Rosenbury has argued, the law needs to recognize these
spaces and the implications of children spending time there as well. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between
Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 834 (2007).
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perhaps reflecting this, when courts have identified the roles of families and
the public schools with respect to children, they are remarkably similar. They
include providing children with an education, dispensing discipline, and ensuring their safety.40 These roles, therefore, boil down to caretaking, or meeting the needs of children that children cannot meet on their own.41
While courts all over the country, from local state courts to federal
courts, have undoubtedly found cause to address the roles of the family and
the public schools with respect to children, the review that follows focuses
on the Supreme Court’s discussions on that topic. It does so in part for brevity and in part because the Supreme Court’s influence on this topic, as with
any other, is profound. Although the Court’s statements on the roles of families and schools are made by way of justifying and explaining its decisions,
they are by no means mandates.42 They are nonetheless significant because
they reflect the Court’s understandings and expectations, as well as society’s
more generally. As such, the Court has found some of the roles to be constitutionally protected.43
A. The Family’s Roles with Respect to Children
When the Supreme Court has addressed the role of the family with respect to children, it generally is assessing state regulations affecting and limiting family decision-making in realms such as child education, childcare,
and child upbringing. In sum, this jurisprudence reveals that the Supreme
Court understands families’ roles to include providing education for their
children, helping them to develop moral standards, teaching them to understand and embrace the basic principles of citizenship, and caring for and disciplining them.44 While more is surely expected of families, the legal system
understands families to carry out these duties at the very least.45 Calling these
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. As already noted, Martha Fineman would call these needs “dependency needs” while Maxine Eichner primarily calls them “caretaking.” See supra note 37, and accompanying text. This
Article calls them caretaking, in part, because the description so aptly fits the work.
42. While the Supreme Court does not mandate that families perform any of these roles, states
do. Parents can be prosecuted for neglect for doing things like failing to care for their children and
failing to send them to school. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (noting that
while “[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State . . . to impose reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education” and thus override a parent’s generalized objection to it, the
objection in this case was protected by the First Amendment because it was grounded in specific
religious bases).
43. See infra Part II.A.1.
44. See infra notes 50–65 and accompanying text.
45. In Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Court noted that “[i]t is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). As much as the Court then
identifies some obligations of families in order to decide this proper line between state regulations
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family roles “roles” or “duties,” though, understates the matter. In most
cases, the Court not only identifies these roles and duties but also states that
they are liberty interests.46 As such, they are of course more than mere tasks
the families have responsibility for carrying out, as the terms “role” or “duty”
might suggest. They also carry heightened doctrinal protections.47
1. The Family’s Role in Educating Children and Its “Additional
Obligations”
In a pair of cases decided nearly a century ago but just two years apart,
the Supreme Court identified families as having a significant role in the education of children. This role includes both a voice in determining the substance and the process of children’s education. In Meyer v. Nebraska,48 the
Court discussed the family’s role in deciding the substance of children’s education in order to resolve whether a Nebraska state law that prohibited the
teaching in schools of any language other than English before ninth grade
violated parents’ and teachers’ Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.49 In
finding those liberty interests violated, the Court said that they include the
right not only of the teacher to teach but also the “right of parents to engage
[the child].”50 The Court said that “it is the natural duty of the parent to give
[their] children education” as well as to “control the education of their
own.”51 While this right of control is not unlimited, the Court nonetheless
clearly identifies that families have a role in and a right to determine the substance—here, the teaching of German—of a child’s education.52
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Pierce v. Society of Sisters,53 which gave it cause to consider the family’s role in making decisions
about the process by which children receive their education.54 In Pierce, the

and family decisionmaking regarding children, it also acknowledges what may seem obvious: that
parents have comprehensive caretaking responsibilities regarding their children and any roles the
Court identifies, then, are but a subset of those comprehensive caretaking responsibilities. Id. at
166–67.
46. See infra Part II.C.
47. An exception among the cases cited here in which parents’ responsibilities do not imbue
them with heightened protection is Prince v. Massachusetts. There, the Supreme Court acknowledged the significance of parents’ caretaking responsibilities but, nonetheless, found the parent’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated when the state infringed upon her decisionmaking regarding her children in the form of prosecution for violating child labor laws. 321 U.S.
at 166–67.
48. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
49. Id. at 398–99.
50. Id. at 400.
51. Id. at 400–01.
52. Id. at 401.
53. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
54. Id. at 532.
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Court heard a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an Oregon statute that
required parents to send their children to public school without any relevant
exception for private or parochial schools.55 To reach its conclusion that the
statute violated the parents’ liberty interests, the Court reiterated the principle
in Meyer that parents’ liberty rights include the right to “direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control.”56 Because the rights in Pierce
involved parents’ decisions over how, or the process by which, children receive an education, Pierce represents the idea that parents’ liberty interests
in the control of their children’s education includes some control over the
process by which they get that education. In addition, the Pierce decision
identifies that the parents’ role with respect to their children involves more
than just controlling their education. The Court said in Pierce that parents
“have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their
children] for additional obligations[,]” though it did not elaborate on what
those additional obligations are.57
2.

The Family’s Role in the Inculcation of Moral Standards,
Religious Beliefs, and Elements of Good Citizenship

In Wisconsin v. Yoder,58 the Court identified some of those “additional
obligations.”59 Yoder involved the question of whether the State of Wisconsin could require Amish children to attend school in violation of their religious beliefs.60 Three Amish parents challenged the law and their resulting
criminal convictions.61 In upholding the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the convictions based on the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court noted that parents have an interest and a role in directing the upbringing
of their children, including their religious upbringing.62 The Court also cited
Pierce’s identification of “additional obligations” parents have in raising
children.63 It said that these “additional obligations” “must be read to include
the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship.”64 In order to teach these beliefs and standards of citizenship,
families can opt to not send their children to school—at least when doing so
55. Id. at 530. The Court noted that the issue in the case was not whether the state has the
power to require that children be educated by attendance at some school. Id. at 534. The question
instead was whether the state could preclude attendance at non-public schools. Id.
56. Id. at 534–35.
57. Id. at 535.
58. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59. Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).
60. Id. at 207.
61. Id. at 208–09.
62. Id. at 213–14.
63. Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35).
64. Id.
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would “contravene[] the basic religious tenets and practices” of their religious beliefs.65
3. The Family’s Caretaking and Disciplinary Roles
Finally, in Prince v. Massachusetts66 and again in later cases like Santosky v. Kramer,67 the Court lays out two roles for families implied in earlier
cases: caretaking and disciplinary roles. Unlike Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder,
neither Prince nor Santosky addressed a regulation regarding the education
of children. Prince involved a challenge by Sarah Prince to a law prohibiting
children under certain ages from working.68 Sarah Prince was convicted of
violating the statute when she allowed her niece, over whom she had custody,
to distribute religious magazines on the street.69 She appealed her conviction
and argued that it violated her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.70 Although the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, it stated: “It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”71 Thus, in Prince, the Court explicitly identified the parents’ caretaking role over their children.
Santosky raised the question of the proper standard of proof to be used
when terminating parents’ rights to their children based on allegations of
abuse or neglect.72 The petitioners in the case, John Santosky II and Annie
Santosky, were the parents of two children, Tina and John III, who were removed from their parents’ care based on allegations of neglect.73 A third
child, Jed, born later, was also removed from the home.74 Finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the Santoskys were, among other things, “incapable, even with public assistance, of planning for the future of their children,” the Ulster County, New York Family Court terminated their parental
rights.75 The Santoskys challenged that holding, arguing that the standard of
proof violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.76 The Supreme Court

65. Id. at 218.
66. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
67. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
68. 321 U.S. at 160–61.
69. Id. at 161–62. Sarah Prince also had two sons, and they were with her and her niece distributing religious materials on the street. Id. at 159. Prince’s convictions under Massachusetts’s
child labor laws, however, only involved the work done by her niece. Id. at 159–60.
70. Id. at 159–60.
71. Id. at 166.
72. 455 U.S. at 747–48.
73. Id. at 751.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 752.
76. Id.
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agreed.77 It held that “use of a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ standard
in such [termination of parental rights] proceedings is inconsistent with due
process.”78 To reach this conclusion, the Court reiterated the fundamental
liberty interest of parents in the “care, custody, and management” of their
children.79 In doing so, it reaffirmed the role of the family as caretakers and
custodians of children.80 By naming the “management” of children as among
these roles, it also suggested that families’ responsibilities include disciplining their children.81 Indeed, their interest in the care and management, or
discipline, of their children is so strong that it justifies a higher standard of
proof than a preponderance of the evidence before their rights to their children can be taken away.82
B. The Public Schools’ Roles with Respect to Children
Just as the Supreme Court has identified some of the roles of families
with respect to children, so too has it identified the roles of the public schools.
It identified these roles while determining the proper limits of schools’ authority. With the exception of infusing children with religious beliefs, the
roles of the public schools’ overlap substantially with those of families.
Before describing these roles, it is worth addressing one potentially nagging point. That is, although the Supreme Court has identified these roles for
schools, it does not require that they fulfill them. Consequently, one could
77. Id. at 758.
78. Id. (quoting Family Court Act, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (McKinney, 1975 & supp. 1981–
1982)).
79. Id. at 753.
80. Id.
81. Id. The term “management” implicitly encompasses the authority and right of parents to
discipline their children. Indeed, courts have recognized parents’ right to discipline their children.
See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (“School discipline, like parental discipline, is
an integral and important part of training our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.”)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting)); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (the fundamental
right of parents to discipline their children includes the right to delegate that right).
82. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 758. More specifically, the Court stated,
[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. . . .If anything, persons faced with
forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.
Id. at 753. Further, the Court continued,
In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding;
the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight . . .[such] that
use of a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard in such proceedings is inconsistent
with due process.
Id. at 758.
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perhaps argue that these identified roles have little relevance to legal analysis
because they are not doctrinally mandated or protected. Indeed, while the
roles identified for families often hold constitutional significance because
they fall under the ambit of protected liberty interests, the roles identified for
schools do not.83 However, this argument fails to acknowledge that these
roles identified for schools and families serve as the rationales in the Court’s
decision-making. The Court’s statements about schools’ roles, like families’
roles, form the basis, sometimes the sole basis, for its decisions. Thus, they
are hardly irrelevant. Moreover, the Court not only uses the roles to justify
its decisions, but it also treats them as self-evident and not even warranting a
citation. For example, it did both, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser84 when it said, without citation, “schools must teach by example the
shared values of a civilized social order” to support its conclusion regarding
the school’s suppression of student speech.85 These roles thus serve a significant function in the development of doctrine and for that reason, among others, merit exploration and analysis.
1. The Public Schools’ Role in Educating Students and Preparing
Them for Citizenship
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has identified the public
schools’ role to include educating students so they are prepared for citizenship and participation in the democracy. Sometimes that role supports the
protection of students’ constitutional rights in school, and sometimes it does
not. Either way, though, the role is oft-repeated by the Court. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,86 for example, the Court considered the question of whether all students could be required to salute the American flag, including students for whom doing so would be a violation of their
beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses.87 In determining that the State of West Virginia could not require the students to salute the flag in violation of their

83. See infra Part II.C.
84. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
85. Id. at 683. The Court has done the same thing with respect to families’ roles. In Wisconsin
v. Yoder, the Court coupled parents’ roles with their First Amendment interests to justify excepting
the parents in question from otherwise “reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education.” 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). It said, “[t]he duty to prepare the child for ‘additional obligations,’ referred to by the Court, must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.” Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).
86. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
87. Id. at 628–29. The consequence for failing to salute the flag was extreme: expulsion. What
is more, not only did schools have to expel students for failing to salute the flag, but when they did
not attend school as a result of that very expulsion, the students and their parents could be prosecuted
for delinquency. Id. at 629.

2018]

THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

439

religious beliefs, the Court noted that schools perform many “important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,” but ultimately, what they are doing
is “educating the young for citizenship.”88 For that reason, the Court stated
that students’ constitutional rights must be “scrupulous[ly] protect[ed],” including their First Amendment rights.89
Again in other First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has reiterated
that schools are educating students for citizenship. In Ambach v. Norwich,90
the Court reasoned that a school’s role is to prepare students for citizenship,
including by “developing students’ attitude toward government and understanding of the role of citizens in our society.”91 In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,92 the Court had to
determine whether a school board on Long Island could ban certain books
from school libraries.93 It overturned the ban94 and again acknowledged the
schools’ role in educating students for citizenship, and it noted that this role
required that constitutional rights be protected so students are not taught to
“discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”95
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court used the school’s
role in educating students for citizenship as the rationale for its decision that
a student could be suspended for making a lewd speech at school.96 In Fraser, the Court stated: “The role and purpose of the American public school
system . . . [is to] prepare pupils for citizenship . . . .”97 The Court concluded:
“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the school’s
basic educational mission[,]”98 and that mission includes teaching students
how to appropriately engage in the discourse expected in a democracy.99
2. The Public Schools’ Role in the Inculcation of Morals, Values,
and Behavioral Norms
The Supreme Court has not limited itself to broad statements regarding
the public schools’ role in educating students for citizenship. Although it has

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 637, 642.
Id.
441 U.S. 68 (1979).
Id. at 78.
457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Id. at 855–56.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 864–65 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 681–82.
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acknowledged that schools’ functions are “highly discretionary,”100 it has still
identified, with some specificity, what it understands schools’ functions to
involve. In several cases, the Court has stated that schools have a role in
teaching students morals, values, and behavioral norms.
In at least three First Amendment cases, Ambach, Pico, and Fraser, the
Court identifies these roles for schools.101 In Ambach, the Court said that
schools are “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values . . . and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment” to support
its conclusion that school teachers could be required to be citizens.102 In Pico,
the Court said that schools are to “transmit community values” and they have
an “interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they
social, moral, or political.”103 That did not mean, however, that schools could
suppress ideas without violating the First Amendment.104
The Court got even more specific in its pronouncements regarding
schools’ functions in Fraser, stating schools teach “fundamental values of
‘habits and manners of civility[,]’” and these “must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views . . . [and] consideration of the
sensibilities of others.”105 It also stated that society has an interest in having
schools teach “the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”106 Consequently, the public school was justified in the suppression of a student’s lewd
speech.107
The Court has also identified these roles for schools outside of its First
Amendment cases. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,108 a Fourth
Amendment case, the Court considered whether mandatory drug testing for
student athletes violated students’ rights to be free from unreasonable
searches.109 In deciding such searches did not violate the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the Court quoted Fraser, saying that it
is “the power and indeed the duty [of schools] to inculcate the habits and
manners of civility.”110 This duty is part of the heightened degree of supervision schools have over students that justified the drug testing at issue.111
100. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 91–99.
102. 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
103. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)
(quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10, Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (No. 80-243)).
104. Id.
105. 478 U.S. at 675, 681 (1986).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 685.
108. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
109. Id. at 648.
110. Id. at 655 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681).
111. Id.
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3. The Public Schools’ Disciplinary Role
As part, perhaps, of teaching these values and behavioral norms, the
Court has also implicitly and explicitly stated that schools’ role includes disciplining students. The Court has done so implicitly when affirming schools’
imposition of discipline that also constitutes the suppression of speech, as in
Fraser.112 By affirming the imposition of discipline, the Court in essence is
acknowledging the appropriateness of disciplinary function more generally
by schools.
The Court has also explicitly identified this disciplinary role for schools
in cases like Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District113
and Board of Education of District 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls.114 In
Tinker, the Court’s task was to decide whether suspending students for wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War violated their
First Amendment rights.115 Although the Court concluded that the suspensions did violate the students’ First Amendment rights, the Court also repeatedly stated that some speech could be suppressed if it “materially and substantially disrupt[ed] the work and discipline of the school.”116 In other
words, discipline in school is flatly identified as one of the functions of
school; indeed, one so crucial that its disruption could justify infringement
on students’ First Amendment rights. In Earls, the Court was deciding
whether a school’s drug testing requirement for all extracurricular activities
was proper under the Fourth Amendment.117 In deciding it was, the Court
again drew on its understanding of schools’ role. It stated: “A student’s privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline . . . .”118 Whether explicit or implicit,
though, the role is identified across cases over many decades as squarely one
of schools’.
4. The Public Schools’ Custodial Role and Role in Protecting the
Health and Safety of Children
Finally, the Court has said that schools have both a custodial role with
respect to children and a role in maintaining their health and safety.119 The
Court discussed this custodial role in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
when it concluded that the drug testing of student athletes does not violate
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

478 U.S. at 685.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
393 U.S. at 504–05.
Id. at 511, 513.
536 U.S. at 827.
Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
See infra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
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the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that schools’ authority over students was not identical to that of parents, whose authority is not subject to
constitutional strictures, but the Court nonetheless said that schools have a
“custodial and tutelary [role], permitting a degree of supervision and control
that could not be exercised over free adults.”120 Identifying this role then
helped to justify the search of students at issue in the case. More specifically,
the Court said that the “‘reasonableness’ inquiry [required under the Fourth
Amendment] cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”121
This custodial role includes some caretaking responsibilities, as the
Court identified in Earls. There, the Court again noted that the schools have
this custodial responsibility and, as such, are responsible for maintaining the
“discipline, health, and safety” of students.122 Indeed, these caretaking roles
are so significant that they serve as the basis for limiting students’ privacy
interests in school.123
C. The Same or Similar Roles, but Different Constitutional
Significance
All of the roles identified for families and schools, then, involve a significant amount of overlap. In addition, the core function of those overlapping roles is caretaking of children.124 It is caretaking work because it involves meeting the needs of children that they cannot meet themselves.125
Children cannot independently educate themselves for citizenship, teach
themselves morals and values, discipline themselves, or maintain their health
and safety. They need others to do that for them. In identifying these roles
for both families and the public schools, Supreme Court doctrine reflects that
the Court sees both families and schools as being involved in these caretaking
roles.
At the same time, as much as these roles are similar or, at least on a
practical level, the same, the Court treats them very differently in terms of
their constitutional significance. Families’ roles with respect to their children
represent the embodiment of Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. They
120. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
121. Id. at 656. That said, the Court in Acton also noted in dicta that as much as schools have
this custodial role, it does not result in schools also having “such a degree of control over children
as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect.’” Id. at 655 (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago
Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
122. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. The Court quoted Acton when it stated, “Central . . . is the fact that
the subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody
of the State as schoolmaster.” Id. at 830 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 654).
123. Id. at 830–31.
124. See supra notes 37, 41 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
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also implicate, among other things, First Amendment free exercise interests.
In Meyer, the Court said, “[w]ithout doubt, [the liberty guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment denotes] . . . the right [to] . . . bring up children.”126
Similarly, in Pierce, the Court said the education statute in question was unconstitutional because it “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.”127 In Yoder, the Court identified as among the “fundamental rights
and interests . . . the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children.”128 With respect to the public schools, however,
the Court has pointedly concluded that their roles are not infused with the
same constitutional significance. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,129 the Court dispensed with the notion that the public schools’ authority is in loco parentis
and therefore imbued with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment or
free from the strictures of the First or the Fourth.130 It said that idea “is in
tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court.”131 The
roles of families and schools, then, are similar or the same, but also not.
II. THE FAMILIES’ AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ DISSIMILAR DEGREES OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARMS TO CHILDREN
The constitutional significance of the families’ roles might suggest that
families enjoy greater protection from interference in carrying out their caretaking responsibilities than schools.132 The opposite, however, is true. When
children are harmed in the care of their families, families can and readily do
face significant responsibility on an institutional level. That is, consequences
inure not just to the individual who caused the harm but also to the family as
a whole. This institutional responsibility includes that the family structure
can be altered. In cases of child abuse and neglect, this structural alteration
occurs when a child is removed from the family.133 This family responsibility
is relatively easy to impose. The legal threshold for investigation of abuse
and neglect in the majority of states is very low, sometimes requiring nothing
more than a mere suspicion of some harm to or neglect of the child; in application, the factual allegations required to support the imposition of liability
can also be relatively insignificant.134 By contrast, imposing liability for

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 336.
Id.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
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harm to children on the public schools as institutions—that is, holding the
public schools and not just individual staff liable—requires overcoming substantial obstacles. Schools’ liability could be imposed by the assertion of a
number of different claims. For all such claims, though, the threshold legal
standards are high, and the facts that have to be alleged to support them are
extreme.
A. The Ease of Imposing Responsibility on the Family for Harms to
Children
All states have a system for imposing responsibility on families when
children are harmed in their care. These systems, embodied in child abuse
and neglect laws, all provide mechanisms for reporting, investigating, and
adjudicating allegations of abuse or neglect of children.135 Although many
child welfare laws allow for the investigation of abuse and neglect perpetuated by non-family members, the thrust of the laws and the child welfare systems they establish is to protect children from harms resulting from abuse or
neglect by family members.136
1. A Broad, Low Threshold for Family Responsibility
As Doriane Lambelet Coleman has pointed out, child welfare laws have
intentionally broad, low legal standards for what constitutes abuse and neglect because the goal of the laws is to cast a wide net to root out any possible
abuse or neglect.137 For example, the definition of “abuse” can simply mean

135. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT
2014, at viii (2014), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2014.pdf#page=10 [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT].
136. This focus on families is reflected in the statistics on the relationship between maltreated
children and the perpetrators of that maltreatment. In federal fiscal year (“FFY”) 2014, 91.6% of
children who were victims of abuse were maltreated by parents. Id. at 26. Of course, this need for
protection from harms to children by family members exists. In FFY 2014, the United States Department of Health and Human Services Children’s Bureau estimated that 1580 children nationally
died of abuse or neglect. Id. at 51. It is also worth noting, though, that as much as this need for
protection exists, so too does bias exist in the system, as even the federal government has acknowledged.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RACIAL
DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE 1 (Nov. 2016),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/racial_disproportionality.pdf#page=1&view=Introduction
[hereinafter RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY] (acknowledging the racial bias and class bias in the
child welfare system). Scholars have also pointed out this bias. E.g., Coleman, supra note 9, at 417
(arguing that the child welfare system does more harm than good in its attempts to help children);
Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 940 (2013) (arguing that race, among other things, serves
as a heuristic in child welfare cases).
137. Coleman, supra note 9, at 428 (“The first feature of the prevailing strategy involves, at
least in principle, taking no chances and casting the widest net possible in identifying the cases that
will be investigated. This objective is accomplished through broad legal definitions of abuse and

2018]

THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

445

“the infliction or allowing of physical injury”138 or “any willful act . . . that
results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm.”139 Indeed, in all
but twelve states, the abuse—or neglect—need not be of any particular degree.140 Because these definitions do not require any degree of harm, any
amount of physical injury or neglect can suffice to meet this definition and
lead to families’ involvement in the child welfare system.
The system for discovering child abuse and neglect is multi-step; the
first step is reporting mere suspicions of abuse and neglect.141 While continued involvement in the child welfare system after an initial report requires
that the state meet a higher burden of proof, the substantive definition of
abuse and neglect remains the same at each step.142 So, while the state may
need to marshal more evidence of abuse or neglect later in the child welfare
neglect, and screening criteria that are nearly as broad. It also involves statutory or regulatory provisions that mandate the investigation of all screened-in reports, and related provisions that allow
state officials to go to court to compel compliance with the investigations.”).
138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(2) (2014).
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West 2010).
140. Those twelve states are Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Texas. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 161602 (2009); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-1 (LexisNexis 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020 (West 2016); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(2)
(2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-710 (2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.9 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-2 (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101 (West 2015); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.001 (West 2014). North Carolina, though, only imposes a particularized degree
of harm for abuse, but it does not impose one for neglect. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101 (West
2015). Doriane Lambelet Coleman notes that these definitions are “typically vague and overbroad,
often purposefully so.” See Coleman, supra note 9, at 428.
141. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 135, at 7–8 (“For FFY 2014, a nationally estimated
2.2 million reports (screened-in referrals) received dispositions. This is an 8.3 percent increase from
the 2010 national estimate of 2.0 million reports that received dispositions.”). Even in early stages
of investigations, families face the risk of structural alteration and institutional-level responsibility.
Consider, for instance, New York, where a child can be removed from their parent without consent
or court process upon reasonable cause to believe the child is in imminent danger. N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW § 417(1)(a) (McKinney 2010). However, if the cause is not reasonable, the child is still removed from the parent’s care, thus altering the structure of the family at least temporarily. As at
least one scholar has pointed out that even the risk of such removals, let alone the actual removals,
however temporary, causes harm to families. Doriane Lambelet Coleman has described the harms
that arise to even young children from the intrusiveness of the investigation and the potential for
removal from the home. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 511–22. Matthew Fraidin also cites the
work of Dr. Joseph Doyle on the outcomes of children in foster care, which include increased interaction with the juvenile justice system, teen pregnancy, and difficulty finding employment. Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child
Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2010).
142. See Coleman supra note 9, at 429 (“In part because the definitions of abuse and neglect are
so broad, and because anyone is permitted to make a report, including those with no training in
identifying maltreatment, most states have procedures to ‘screen in’ reports that conform to their
official interpretations, and correspondingly to ‘screen out’ nonconforming reports. This process
serves to ensure, to the extent possible, that the state conducts formal investigations only in circumstances where legally relevant conditions exist.”).
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process to meet the higher standards of proof, in most states, the evidence
still only needs to prove that some abuse or neglect happened, not that it was
particularly severe.143 Families face the risk of involvement in the child welfare system, and therefore the risk of institutional responsibility based on allegations and proof of some abuse or neglect, potentially no matter the severity.
2. The Low Threshold in Application
Of course, that families face a large theoretical risk of institutional responsibility does not mean that risk will be realized through abuse or neglect
investigation or prosecution.144 The child welfare statistics, however, suggest
many families do face this consequence. In Federal Fiscal Year (“FFY”)
2014, approximately twenty-three percent of children for whom states received reports of abuse and neglect were removed from the home and placed
in foster care.145
The reasons for this degree of family responsibility are not just that a
great deal of child maltreatment happens, though of course it does happen.146
The reasons include that the child welfare system has been willing to find the
removal of children from families appropriate even when allegations arguably do not justify it.147 Recall, for example, In re L.Z., the case discussed
briefly in the Introduction.148 In that case, L.Z., a toddler, was removed from
the family, and his mother’s rights were permanently terminated after Child

143. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
144. However, even the possibility of such structural changes by way of an investigation can
result in significant stress and other psychological repercussions. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 9, at
914 (noting that child welfare “investigations are invasive of the right to family integrity and cause
significant anxiety and other emotional distress”).
145. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 135, at 78. And certainly a system that allows for
more than 1500 deaths per year while also causing harm to the children they do take into custody is
one fraught with problems. Id. at 52. Among these problems is the vast disproportionality of cases
involving children of color and children who are low-income. RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY, supra note 136; Coleman, supra note 9, at 441 n.67. The procedural safeguards in place to protect
against these problems, as Clare Huntington has pointed out, are far from sufficient. As Huntington
points out, they are too little too late. The assistance of counsel, for example, if provided, is not
provided until after a child has been removed from the home. Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in
Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 658 (2006).
146. In FFY 2014, approximately one-fifth of the reports of child abuse and neglect were substantiated. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 135, at x.
147. Josh Gupta-Kagan cites the statistic that 26.8% of children who are removed from the home
are returned in six months as persuasive evidence of these unnecessary removals. See Gupta-Kagan,
supra note 9, at 916. He has also pointed out the problems attendant to this over-inclusiveness.
Among them is that it strains the system to the point of being nearly incapable of protecting children
who truly do need it. Id. at 912–13.
148. 111 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2015).
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Protective Services (CPS) became involved with the family.149 CPS involvement occurred as the result of harms to L.Z. that CPS attributed to his aunt,
with whom L.Z. and his mother lived.150 L.Z.’s mother left him in his aunt’s
care for two days, and when she returned to him, he had a cut on his penis as
well as a bruise on his cheeks, diaper rash, and a yeast infection.151 Although
CPS attributed these harms to the aunt, his mother nonetheless lost custody
of him. In other words, the mother and son experienced a significant change
to their family structure for injuries that the mother did not inflict.152
In another case, In Re Adam B.,153 a mother, Alma B., lost custody of
her three boys for arguably inadequate reasons.154 Alma B. lost custody of
her oldest child, Joshua, because she could not get him to take his psychiatric
medications and did not ensure he attended all of his outpatient mental health
therapy sessions.155 She lost custody of her younger son, Isaiah, because he
received a burn, possibly from a space heater, and she did not seek medical
treatment immediately.156 In addition, the lower court made a finding that
she could not protect Isaiah from Joshua.157 Alma lost custody of her third
son, Adam, because of “anticipatory neglect,” meaning that the court concluded that there was a probability he would be neglected because his brothers had been neglected.158 Although evidence indicated that Alma B. also
missed three voluntary parenting classes and seemed agitated and anxious at
the hospital when doctors, suspecting abuse, questioned her, these and other
allegations in the case do not unquestionably lead to the conclusion that Alma
B. should have lost custody of her children.159
Another reading of her case is that she was struggling with the difficult
task of parenting—as a single parent—a child with a significant psychiatric
disorder, which could explain why she could not get him to all of his therapy
sessions and to take all of his medicine. That, in turn, could also explain why
149. Id. at 1167–69.
150. Id. at 1167–68.
151. Id.
152. Id. One issue before the court was whether the mother had to be physically present at the
time the injuries occurred in order to be presumed to have abused her child. Id. at 1175–76. The
court concluded she did not. It said that even if the parent was not present at the time of the abuse,
the parent could nonetheless be found to have abused or neglected her child “due to his or her failure
to provide protection for the child.” Id. at 1184. In so holding, the court specifically noted that the
mother had failed to provide evidence that she had “no reason to fear leaving Child with Aunt.” Id.
at 1186. Thus, its interpretation of the relevant statute allows for parents who do not abuse their
children to be held responsible if they cannot prove a negative.
153. 53 N.E.3d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 140–42.
156. Id. at 141–42.
157. Id. at 144.
158. Id. at 145.
159. Id. at 137.
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Joshua may himself have burned Isaiah. While Alma missed parenting classes, she missed them during the time when she was also dealing with Joshua’s
psychiatric hospitalization. Further, while Alma seemed agitated when questioned by doctors about possible abuse, that reaction is hardly irrational when
a mother is being questioned in such a way. Reading the facts in this way
suggests that Alma B. needed support, not that she needed to lose her children. Indeed, the social worker who worked most closely with the family
testified:
that she observed Alma B.’s interactions with the children from
March of 2014 through July of 2014 and that they were appropriate; that during this time, the children never stated that they felt
unsafe in Alma B.’s care, nor did they show any signs of abuse or
neglect; that they appeared well nourished, clean and appropriately
dressed; and that she observed Alma B. redirecting Joshua when
he would misbehave and she saw Alma B. engage with her children.160
That the child welfare system chose the narrative that left her family structurally altered evidences the readiness with which it will impose institutional
responsibility on the family for harms to children.
This readiness to remove children from families is also reflected in cases
where parents are working with the child welfare system to address causes
and effects of suspected child abuse and neglect. In In re Katie S.,161 a case
involving neglect, a mother lost parental rights even though she was actively
trying to better her ability to parent.162 She lost custody of her two children,
Katie S. and David S., who were five and sixteen months, respectively, at the
time the case was brought.163 To be sure, the allegations support a finding of
neglect.164 The mother acknowledged that she did not feed her children regularly and she sometimes left them unsupervised.165 However, a counselor
who was working with the mother testified that she was dutifully attending
counseling sessions and sincerely trying to get her children back.166 Yet instead of letting the mother continue to make these efforts to see if she could
learn to improve herself and her parenting, the West Virginia Supreme Court
terminated her parental rights.167 It also did so only approximately seven
months after the case began, giving her less than a full year to try to learn to

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 138–39.
479 S.E.2d 589 (W.Va. 1996).
Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 601.
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be a better parent.168 The court removed the mother’s children and undermined her efforts, demonstrating the legal system’s willingness to hold families responsible for harms to children.
Greene v. Camreta169 is a similar case involving a mother who lost custody of her children despite evidence that she was working cooperatively
with the child welfare system.170 The difference in Greene was that she was
not accused of any abuse or neglect.171 In Greene, Sarah Greene temporarily
lost custody of her two daughters, S.G. and K.G., because of allegations that
Sarah’s husband and the girls’ father, Nimrod Greene, had sexually abused
an unrelated boy and S.G.172 Although she successfully raised constitutional
challenges to the temporary loss of custody, her case shows again how easy
it is to hold families responsible for harms to children despite evidence that
one parent has caused no harm or has worked to ameliorate the harm.173
Cases of domestic violence also serve as examples of this readiness to
impose family responsibility. In these cases, the family is sometimes held
responsible not only for harms parents did not impose but from which they
also suffered.174 For example, in In re N.P.,175 B.P., a mother and survivor of
domestic violence, lost custody of her two daughters, N.P. and I.P.176 B.P.
was abused by her husband, M.P.177 Related to that, the family underwent
several household moves, and B.P. consequently suffered “battered women’s
syndrome.”178 Both N.P. and I.P. witnessed that abuse, and they therefore
suffered depressive disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder.179 As a result,

168. Id. at 598.
169. 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1019–20. The mother, Sarah Greene, submitted an affidavit in which she stated that
she had told the case worker investigating suspected abuse that she would comply with a Department of Human Services safety plan. That plan called for ensuring that Sarah’s husband would not
have contact with her daughters and for the girls to be evaluated for sexual abuse. Id. at 1018, 1035.
172. Id. at 1016, 1020.
173. Id. at 1035–36.
174. A number of scholars have written about the problems of removing children from the custody of their mothers because they have witnessed their mothers’ abuse. E.g., Leigh Goodmark,
Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 655 (2004–
2005) (arguing that the legal system needs to better tailor its responses to child witnesses of domestic
violence to better address the problem and protect children); Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You
Have Is a Hammer: Society’s Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L.
REV. 919, 925 (2011) (calling for a more flexible response, including in the child welfare system,
to intimate partner violence).
175. 882 A.2d 241 (D.C. 2005).
176. Id. at 243–44.
177. Id. at 244.
178. Id. at 245–46.
179. Id. at 245.
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B.P. lost custody of her children because of the harms imposed by her husband.180
While these cases discuss the imposition of family responsibility by way
of removing a child from the family and thus altering the family structure as
a whole, that is not the only way to impose responsibility on the family as an
institution in cases of child abuse or neglect. Such responsibility can also be
imposed when the adjudicatory process requires a parent to be placed on a
central child abuse and neglect registry.181 Inclusion on these registries can
affect job prospects and thus the economic stability of the whole family.182
Further, when the parent must comply with a safety plan, the plan’s strictures
can affect the whole family.183 Removal of the child from the home, then, is
simply the most obvious way of imposing responsibility on the family as a
whole for harms to children.
The intent of the foregoing discussion is neither to say that children
should never be removed from the home nor that any child should have to
suffer any harm, whether or not severe. It is to say, though, that these legal
standards, cases, and statistics reflect the relative ease with which the family
can be held responsible as an institution for harms to children even when the
parents have not themselves imposed the harm, are working to improve their
parenting, or themselves suffer from the harm that results in family liability.
B. The Relative Difficulty of Imposing Responsibility on Schools for
Harms to Children
By contrast, when children are harmed in school because of the actions
of school officials or others, imposing responsibility on the public schools is
an altogether different matter. A number of claims could potentially be made
against the school to hold it as an entity, as opposed to any individual actor,
responsible for such harms. None, however, are easy to make. The threshold
legal standards are high, and, in application, the facts that have to be alleged
to satisfy those standards are extreme.184 That is not to say that students have
180. Id. at 251. While B.P. surely needed assistance to help extricate herself from her marriage
and take care of her children, the state effectively revictimized her by permanently altering her
whole family structure. G. Kristian Miccio, for example, critiqued a child welfare system that allows for this treatment of women experiencing domestic violence and their children in this way as
penalizing the women while simultaneously failing to help the children. G. Kristian Miccio, A
Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in
Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 91 (1999).
181. Josh Gupta-Kagan offers a thoughtful discussion on the problems associated with these
central registries and safety plans. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 9, at 900–05.
182. Id. at 900.
183. Id.
184. That is not to say that an individual who actually caused the harm cannot be held responsible for something when they harm children. Indeed, they can. For example, Kathleen Garrett, the
teacher discussed infra, was found guilty of child maltreatment in a related criminal matter. T.W.
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no hope of succeeding against schools; they do.185 It is to say, though, that
claims against schools are hard to make, especially as compared to the relative ease with which families as a whole face repercussions for harms to children. The cases below demonstrate that even when children suffer significant
harms in school, attempts to hold the schools responsible are fraught with
challenges. Children who are harmed in school have to fashion a claim out
of law that has, quite simply, developed in such a way that schools as institutions are protected from being held responsible for it.186
1. Substantive Due Process Claims for Physical and Emotional
Harm in School
When a child is injured in school as the result of harms perpetrated by
school staff, a child can try to hold the school responsible by alleging a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests in “personal privacy
and bodily security.”187 The standard for establishing this violation is high.
The test has three or four parts, depending on the federal circuit in which the
case is brought. All courts will balance three factors: 1) the need for force;
2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; and 3) the
severity of the injury.188 The requirement of a severe injury alone makes the
ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 599 (11th Cir. 2010); infra notes 191–
204. However, holding schools responsible is difficult. When schools have a lesser degree of responsibility on an institutional level, it leaves children vulnerable to harm in school. See infra Part
III.B.2.
185. For example, in Hill v. Cundiff, a student, Doe, was raped by another student after school
administrators had her act as bait to catch another student in the act of sexual harassment. 797 F.3d
948, 955–56 (11th Cir. 2015). Doe brought Title IX, equal protection, and state tort claims against
the school board and individual school administrators. Id. at 966. The Eleventh Circuit concluded
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the Title IX claim and some of the tort
claims was in error, though it affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the equal protection and
some other state tort claims. Id. at 984–86. Likewise, in Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Board
of Education, a high school teacher allegedly hit a student, Durante Neal, with a metal weight lock
in the eye, and as a result, Neal lost his eye. 229 F.3d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 2000). Neal brought
substantive due process and tort claims against the school board and individual school staff. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court’s dismissal of the substantive due process claims,
concluding that such actions stated a claim for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Students do have viable claims involving harms suffered in school against the schools as institutions,
but when they do, the facts involve extreme circumstances such as rape-baiting and the loss of an
eye.
186. Infra note 188–189 and accompanying text.
187. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (determining a school’s use of corporal
punishment could violate the Fourteenth Amendment, stating “the substantive due process inquiry
in school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was
so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a
merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official
power literally shocking to the conscience”).
188. T.W., 610 F.3d at 599. Some courts will also look at the pedagogical reason more deeply
and inquire as to whether it “was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
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standard high and purposefully so. It explicitly and pointedly serves to protect public schools from liability except in cases of “only the most egregious
official conduct [that] can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional
sense.’”189
Even if a child has suffered severe injuries that could support a substantive due process claim, many of these claims still fail in application. One
reason they tend to fail in application is because the courts have been willing
to excuse the acts of many school officials if a pedagogical or disciplinary
reason—any plausible pedagogical or disciplinary reason—is asserted to satisfy the first prong of the test that inquires into the need for force.190
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County191 offers an example of how courts will strain to find a pedagogical justification to relieve
schools of liability.192 T.W. involved a child, T.W., with pervasive development delay, depression, and anxiety,193 who suffered because of treatment by
his teacher, Kathleen Garrett.194 Among other things, Garrett taunted T.W.,
“pick[ing] and nag[ging him] . . . until he would just get to the point where
he just couldn’t take it anymore” and would act out.195 Then, Garrett would
physically restrain him, one time in such a way that it could have caused
asphyxiation.196 In addition, on one occasion she tripped him.197 As a result,
T.W.’s extant disabilities grew more severe, and he developed a new disability, post traumatic stress disorder.198 The school district could have prevented
this harm because the school district had received reports that Garrett had
mistreated other students.199 The school district did not remove her from
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v.
Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Metzger ex rel. Metzger v.
Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988)).
189. T.W., 610 F.3d at 598 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46
(1998)).
190. See infra notes 203, 210 and accompanying text. In addition, even plaintiffs who can allege
a very severe injury will have a hard time satisfying a court that their injury is of constitutional
magnitude if it is emotional or psychological harm. As courts have noted, “Plaintiffs have not fared
well where psychological damage forms either the sole basis of or is an element of the plaintiff’s
substantive due process claim.” T.W., 610 F.3d at 601 (quoting Dockery v. Barnett, 167 F. Supp.
2d 597, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). For a discussion of how and why emotional harm on its own does
not support substantive due process claims of students, as well as for examples of other cases in
which a substantive due process claim alleging severe harm was overcome by a pedagogical reason
offered by the school for abuse, see Suski, Dark Sarcasm, supra note 38.
191. 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 593.
194. Id. at 594–96.
195. Id. at 594.
196. Id. at 594–96.
197. Id. at 596.
198. Id. at 596, 601.
199. Id. at 594.
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working with children, though.200 Instead, it transferred her to the school
T.W. attended and did not inform the principal of that school of the complaints against her, leaving her free to mistreat children.201
Even though the school district was therefore complicit in allowing
T.W.’s harm to happen, T.W.’s substantive due process claim against the
public schools failed.202 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[t]he evidence
establishes that Garrett’s use of force against T.W. ‘is capable of being construed as an attempt’ to restore order, maintain discipline, or protect T.W.
from self-injurious behavior.”203 Consequently, it affirmed the lower court’s
order of summary judgment in favor of the school board.204 That Garrett
manufactured the disciplinary reason by instigating T.W.’s behavior was
seemingly of no moment. That a manufactured disciplinary justification for
harm suffices to relieve the public schools of responsibility for the harm
shows the difficulty of imposing responsibility on the public schools.
Pedagogical as well as disciplinary goals excused the harm to children
in Domingo v. Kowalski.205 Like T.W., that case involved students with special needs who brought a substantive due process claim against their teacher,
Marsha Kowalski, and the school district because of injuries she caused
them.206 The allegations of mistreatment included that Kowalski “grabb[ed
a] . . . student’s face, squeez[ed] his or her cheeks, and point[ed] the student’s
face toward [her].”207 Kowalski also left a student, who could not independently get on and off a toilet, on the toilet for more than a quarter of the
day.208 She also left another student strapped to a gurney in the hallway outside the classroom with a bandana in his mouth.209 Despite this treatment,
the students did not succeed on their substantive due process claims because
the district court found Kowalski had a “legitimate educational goal of toilettraining and legitimate disciplinary goal of maintaining order and focus in
her classroom” that justified her actions.210 As in T.W., therefore, Domingo

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 605.
203. Id. at 600 (quoting Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168,
174 (3d Cir. 2001)).
204. Id. at 605.
205. 810 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016).
206. Id. at 406.
207. Id. at 407–08.
208. Id. at 407.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 411. The Sixth Circuit found this pedagogical justification even after applying the
fourth factor that considers more deeply whether that justification was a good-faith one. The court
stated,
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shows how even abuse of children in school by teachers will not give rise to
the public schools’ responsibility if the schools can point to some remotely
plausible pedagogical reason for the abuse.211 The stated pedagogical or disciplinary reason justifies the means, seemingly almost no matter how harsh
the means.
2. Claims of Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment in Violation of
Title IX
Just as children are sexually abused at home, they are also sexually
abused at school, both by other students and by teachers. When they are,
they can bring claims alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title IX of
the Civil Rights Act to hold the school responsible for the harassment. Title
IX provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”212 As with substantive due process claims, though,
the threshold standard for making out claims alleging such discrimination is
high; in application, the public schools’ actions in failing to address the harassment must be egregious in order for a claim to succeed.213
The Supreme Court both recognized the validity of Title IX claims for
student-on-student harassment and set the high standard for these claims in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.214 In Davis, the Court concluded that when one student sexually harasses another student, a school
could be held responsible if it was “deliberately indifferent to known acts of
student-on-student sexual harassment” and the harassing student was “under
the school’s disciplinary authority.”215 However, to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard, a school need “merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”216 To avoid liability, then,

Taking all facts in the light most favorable to Appellants, Kowalski used inappropriate
instructional and disciplinary methods. However, as was the conduct of the special-education teacher whose inappropriate techniques were examined by the Eleventh Circuit in
T.W., Kowalski’s educational and disciplinary techniques, though certainly questionable,
were utilized for a proper educational purpose.
Id. at 412.
211. Id. The term “abuse” is appropriate here because Kowalski, like Garrett in T.W., faced child
abuse charges. Kowalski entered into a consent agreement without admitting guilt. Id. at 409.
212. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
213. Catharine MacKinnon has critiqued this standard for failing to meet its promise of sex
equality in education. Catharine MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for
Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038 (2016).
214. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
215. Id. at 646–47.
216. Id. at 649.
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the school has to do something in response.217 The response can be somewhat
or even largely unreasonable. As long as the school’s response was not clearly
unreasonable, though, the school will meet the Davis standard.
Consequently, in application, that standard has meant that almost any
action by the schools will suffice to relieve them of responsibility for harm
to children because of student-on-student sexual harassment. For example,
in Doe v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County,218 an elementaryschool-aged boy, J.D., was subjected to repeated instances of sexual harassment by another boy at his school, and the school was aware of the harassment.219 The school was not held responsible for allowing it to continue,
though, because it responded to the reports of the sexual harassment, however
ineffectually.220 The harassing behaviors J.D. was subjected to all involved
another boy, M.O. M.O., among other things, exposed his genitals to J.D. in
the classroom library, called J.D. “gay,” and climbed into the bathroom stall
J.D. was using while M.O. was partially nude with his pants around his ankles.221 The harassment began in J.D.’s fourth-grade year and continued into
his fifth-grade year.222 In response, the school moved J.D. and M.O.’s desks
apart, gave M.O. an in-school suspension, later warned M.O. that his behavior could lead to a suspension, and gave J.D. a student escort to the bathroom.223 These interventions not only did not stop the abuse, but the bathroom escort also exacerbated J.D.’s harm because it resulted in other students
making “‘horrible jokes’” about J.D.224 Moreover, despite knowing about
the problems with M.O.’s harassment of J.D. in fourth grade, the school again
placed them in the same classroom for fifth grade, thus more readily exposing
J.D. to further abuse by M.O.225 Still, the school’s responses to J.D.’s harassment sufficed to defeat his sexual harassment claim against the school.226
Similarly, in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury,227 the public school was not
held responsible for the sexual harassment of one student by another student
because it also did something—again something ineffective, but something
nonetheless—to address the harassing behavior.228 In Porto, a student, R.C.,
217. Id.
218. 605 F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015 (per curiam)).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 161–63.
222. Id.
223. Id. The school also implemented a sign in/out sheet for the bathroom, but that proved unworkable and was abandoned in less than a week. Id. at 163.
224. Id. at 163.
225. Id. at 162. The action surprised his teacher because she knew of, and knew the school
administration knew of M.O.’s harassment of J.D. in fourth grade. Id.
226. Id. at 170.
227. 488 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2007).
228. Id. at 73–76.
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sexually harassed another, S.C., over a period of a year, culminating in a sexual encounter in the school bathroom.229 S.C.’s mother reported a number of
these incidents to the school.230 The school responded by putting the boys on
different buses, separating them, having the guidance counselor instruct them
the behavior was inappropriate, and giving R.C. detention.231 The harassment
did not stop. As a result of the harassment, S.C. suffered emotional and psychological harm requiring an inpatient stay at a mental health facility and
attempted suicide.232 Despite this harm and the school’s ineffectual responses, S.C.’s Title IX claim against the school failed.233 The claim failed
because the school did respond to the harassment.234 The court concluded
that although the school’s response was ineffective in that the harassment
continued, that did not make it unreasonable.235 Therefore, it met the Davis
deliberate indifference standard.236
That said, courts have concluded that schools need not remedy the sexual harassment in responding to it.237 They have good reasons for granting
this leeway to schools. An honest effort by a school to truly address the sexual harassment of one student by another could still result in continued sexual
harassment. An honest effort to address sexual harassment, though, is quite
different from a half-hearted attempt to halt harm to students or interventions
that cause more harm. Yet, even when schools make half-hearted or counterproductive efforts, the courts do not hold them liable under Title IX.
3. Claims of Teacher-on-Student Sexual Harassment in Violation of
Title IX
As with sexual harassment claims for student-on-student abuse, the
standard for holding the school responsible for teacher-on-student sexual harassment involves overcoming a high bar. To make out a claim for teacheron-student sexual harassment, a student has to show that a school official
with the “authority to take corrective action” has actual notice of the sexual
229. Id. at 70–71.
230. Id. at 70.
231. Id. at 70–71.
232. Id. at 71.
233. Id. at 76.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 74.
236. Id.
237. E.g., Vance v. Spencer Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260 (6th Cir. 2000). In Vance,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
for the children/appellees. Id. at 256. Although the Court stated that schools do not have to remedy
the sexual harassment, they need to still do something that is not clearly unreasonable. Id. at 260.
In Vance, the school principal did nothing in response to at least three instances of sexual harassment. Id. at 262. It is not impossible, then, for a school to be held responsible for student-onstudent sexual harassment. If they do nothing at all in response, that can lead to liability. Id. at 264.
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harassment and “fails adequately to respond.”238 Failing to adequately respond means “the response must amount to deliberate indifference.”239 So
the factors are very similar to student-on-student sexual harassment claims,
and as such, the standard offers a similarly high bar to school responsibility.240
The Supreme Court laid out the standard for public school liability in
cases of teacher-on-student sexual harassment in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.241 There, although the Court found school liability
possible if the actual notice-deliberate-indifference standard is met, it also
concluded that the facts of that case did not meet the standard because the
school did not have actual notice of the sexual harassment.242 In Gebser, a
student, A. Gebser, was sexually harassed repeatedly over a two-year period
by a teacher. More specifically, the teacher engaged in a sexual relationship
with the student during her freshman and sophomore years in high school.243
The harassment did not result in school responsibility, however, because
Gebser failed to explicitly tell any school official with authority that she was
having a sexual relationship with the teacher.244 The school did know the
teacher was making inappropriate comments toward students, but because
Gebser did not explicitly tell the school of the sexual relationship, the court
concluded that the school lacked actual knowledge of the facts constituting
sexual harassment.245 Thus, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the
Gebser standard protects schools from liability for harm to students even
when the perpetrator of the harm was a school official and “the activity was
subsidized, in part, with federal moneys.”246 The standard, then, is high indeed.
In applying this standard, subsequent student claims have failed when
the students cannot show that the school’s notice of the harassment effectively amounted to direct knowledge of it. For example, in J.F.K. v. Troup
County School District,247 a forty-five-year-old teacher, Elizabeth Gaddy, engaged in a sexual relationship over approximately a ten-month period with
O.K.K., a twelve-year-old boy in her homeroom.248 While school officials
were not directly informed that the sexual relationship itself was occurring,
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
Id.
See supra notes 215–216 and accompanying text.
524 U.S. 274 (1998).
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 278, 292.
Id. at 298 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
678 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1256.
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the principal of the school and the superintendent of the school district were
informed repeatedly of inappropriate behavior directed at O.K.K. by
Gaddy.249 The principal was informed, among other things, that Gaddy had
leg-to-leg contact under a blanket on a sofa at her home with O.K.K., that she
bought O.K.K. and no other students expensive gifts, and that she contacted
O.K.K. excessively by text.250 Additionally, O.K.K.’s parents, two other parents, and two teachers at the school alerted the principal to the questionable
behavior.251 In response, the school banned Gaddy from the eighth-grade hall
at the school.252 Despite this behavior, which six adults, two of whom were
teachers at the school, found concerning and the school’s near total lack of
response, the court found the school did not have actual knowledge of the
sexual relationship and therefore the sexual harassment.253 It found that the
school lacked actual notice because it lacked direct knowledge of anything
other than inappropriate behavior.254 As a result, the school faced no responsibility for the harm. 255
Similarly, in Bostic v. Smyrna School District,256 another school official,
John Smith, engaged in a sexual relationship with a student, J. Bostic, who
was a sophomore in the high school where Smith coached.257 The principal
of the school was informed by two teachers, one of whom was Smith’s wife,
and Bostic’s father that Smith’s behavior toward Bostic was inappropriate
and concerning.258 The principal was told that Smith and Bostic were seen
alone in a parked car together at night.259 The principal was also told that
Smith and Bostic were seen standing so closely together in the hallway at
school that the observing teacher thought that they were two students.260 In
addition, Smith’s wife found them alone together in her classroom.261 When
the sexual relationship between Smith and Bostic was discovered, Bostic and
her parents sued Smith and the school under Title IX.262 The case was heard
by a jury, but because the jury had to find actual knowledge of the sexual
relationship and not just evidence of a likely one, the school district was not

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id. at 1257–58.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id.
418 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 357–58.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 357.
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found liable.263 Seemingly nothing short of direct knowledge, therefore, will
suffice to hold schools responsible for teacher-on-student sexual harassment.
Ample reason to suspect and investigate teacher-on-student sexual harassment has not been sufficient.
4. Bullying
As has been widely reported, students also are harmed, and sometimes
die, as the result of bullying in school.264 Students who seek to hold the
school responsible in some way for the harms resulting from bullying,
though, have anything but an easy task before them. Although all fifty states
have anti-bullying laws in place, none create a right of action if the schools
fail to follow them or take any steps to address bullying.265 On their own,
then, the anti-bullying laws provide no way for the schools to be held responsible for harms to children because of bullying in schools. The threshold for
making out a bullying case on its own is not just high; it does not exist.
To make a claim against a school for failing to address bullying, therefore, a student who has been harmed by bullying must bring the claim under
another law. Primarily, these are claims that the bullying amounts to a violation of the student’s liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment or
claims that it constitutes unlawful harassment.266 Unsurprisingly, given the
difficulties previously discussed with bringing these claims against schools,
the cases alleging bullying violated the Fourteenth Amendment or laws prohibiting harassment also have generally not been successful.

263. Id. at 358.
264. Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-after-bullying-raises-worries-on-web-sites.html?_r=0 (reporting on the suicide death of R.A.S., a twelve-year-old Florida
girl, in 2013 after being bullied by other students in her school); Trevon Milliard, Father: White
Middle School Student’s Suicide Related to Bullying, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Feb. 28, 2014),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/father-white-middle-school-students-suicide-related-to-bullying/ (reporting the suicide death of H.L, a thirteen-year-old Nevada girl, after she suffered through
bullying in school and named the bullying as the cause of her death in her suicide note); Yanan
Wang, After Years of Alleged Bullying, an Ohio Teen Killed Herself. Is Her School District Responsible?, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2016/05/23/after-years-of-alleged-bullying-an-ohio-teen-killed-herself-is-her-school-district-responsible/ (reporting on the suicide death of E.O., a thirteen-year-old Ohio girl, in 2014 after
enduring years of bullying in school).
265. See generally Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates, supra note 38 (discussing the bullying
laws’ intrusions into student privacy with lack of any attendant right of action for the students).
266. Students can also potentially make a few other claims, such as a claim under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. CATHERINE E. LHAMON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: RESPONDING TO BULLYING OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-bullying-201410.pdf.
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For example, in Morrow v. Balaski,267 Emily and Brittany Morrow and
their parents brought an action against a school for allowing Emily and Brittany to be bullied.268 They alleged the bullying violated their Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests because the school failed to protect them from
it.269 While the Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services270 concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose any general duty on the state to protect
individuals,271 it has also recognized limited circumstances in which such a
duty does exist.272 The Court has found that the state has a duty to protect,
or care for, prison inmates and persons involuntarily confined to mental
health facilities because they cannot meet their own needs.273 In application,
this standard has meant that children arguing that a school had a duty to protect them must successfully analogize to prisoners or persons committed to
mental health facilities.274 The Morrows’ claim failed because the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found no such fitting analogy. Relying on Supreme Court dicta in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,275 where the
Court said, “we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general
matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect[,]’” the Morrow court consequently concluded that
schools have no duty to protect students from private actors.276 As a result,
the public school was absolved of any responsibility for the harm Emily and

267. 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013).
268. Id. at 164–65.
269. Id. at 166.
270. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
271. Id. at 203.
272. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (“If it is cruel and unusual punishment
to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe conditions.”); Estelle v. Gamble 429
U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stabling the “government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom
it is punishing by incarceration” and noting that “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat
his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”).
273. Id.
274. See infra notes 391–400 and accompanying text. In DeShaney, the Court noted that those
cases in which it found such a duty, Estelle v. Gamble and Youngberg v. Romeo, “stand only for the
proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will,
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being.” 489 U.S. at 199–200. Thus, students have to successfully show that they
have been taken into custody in ways at least similar to that of mental health patients and prisoners
in order to support their argument that schools have a duty to protect them.
275. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
276. 719 F.3d 160, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 655 (1995)).

2018]

THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

461

Brittany suffered by being “verbally, physically and—no doubt—emotionally tormented by a fellow student[,]” even though all they did to address it
was “suggest[] that the Morrows consider moving to a different school.”277
The same kind of challenges plagued the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title IX sexual harassment claims of another student in Morgan v. Town of
Lexington.278 There, the bullied student’s claims were based on both the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.279 The student in Morgan, R.M., suffered repeated physical and verbal bullying in school.280 Among other things,
students at his school pulled him to the ground and “beat him, repeatedly
kicking and punching him in the head and stomach.”281 He was called “‘Mandex Man,’ ‘thunder thighs,’ and ‘hungry hippo’ . . . [and] was ‘pushed,
tripped, punched or verbally assaulted while walking in school hallways.’”282
He “was also ‘table topped,’ in which ‘one person gets down on all fours
behind the victim to push the victim behind the knees, and then one or two
other individuals push the victim so that the victim falls backwards.’”283 As
a result, R.M. experienced anxiety leading him to miss 112 days of school.284
Although the school knew of all of the bullying, in part because some of it
had been captured on video, it did little more than promise to investigate in
response.285 Christine Morgan, R.M.’s mother, argued that the school’s failure to respond to the bullying created the danger and therefore violated
R.M.’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.286 The court, however, decided that
the school’s failure to respond did not create the danger because its inaction
did not affirmatively cause the harm.287 R.M.’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim consequently failed.288 R.M.’s Title IX claim met the same fate because the court concluded that sexual harassment was only one form and not
the primary form of harassment.289 The court said that R.M. endured “undifferentiated bullying” that was not so rooted in sexual harassment as to give
rise to a claim of sex discrimination.290 Thus, even when the schools do nothing in the face of known, severe bullying, they lack responsibility for the
consequent harm to the victims of the bullying.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 166.
823 F.3d 737 (1st Cir. 2016).
Id. at 739–40.
Id. at 740–41.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 741.
Id.
Id. at 744.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 745–46.
Id. at 745.
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5. Tort Claims
Students who have been harmed in school in any of the above discussed
ways or in others ways can also bring an action in tort against the school itself
in addition to or in lieu of any action against an individual actor. As with
substantive due process, Title IX, and bullying-related claims, though, these
common law claims are not easy to make. They do at times succeed, but
student claimants have to overcome the obstacles of immunity and causation
in order to do so.291
When teachers or other school staff members cause harm to students,
schools as entities can be protected from liability by laws granting them immunity.292 Schools enjoy immunity from liability for actions of staff who are
exercising discretionary functions.293 While what counts as “discretionary”
varies by jurisdiction, it has shielded schools from liability for harms to children caused by other staff, other students, and themselves.294
Where immunity does not bar children’s claims against the school entity, they can sue the schools in tort under theories of respondeat superior
and negligent supervision.295 For respondeat superior claims, a child must
show the staff member’s actions for which the school is allegedly responsible
were within the scope of employment.296 This requirement poses a not insig-

291. E.g., Samantha Neiman et al., Bullying: A State of Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 627 (2012)
(noting in addressing claims for bullying “[e]ven when conduct by a school official satisfies the
elements of a common law cause of action, various forms of immunity from tort liability often serve
as shields to school districts.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84
TEMP. L. REV. 385, 410 (2012) (noting, in discussing potential tort claims, a bullied student could
make a claim despite causation and immunity hurdles, but stating, “the prognosis is . . . dim” for
redress); Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004) (providing a
comprehensive analysis of how tort serves as a limited recourse and means of redress for bullying).
J.W. v. Birmingham Board of Education serves as a recent example of the difficulty of bringing
such claims against schools and individual school employees. In that case, students in Birmingham
City Schools in Alabama brought an action against the School Board and Birmingham Police Department for using a chemical spray against them as a “standard response even for the non-threatening infraction that is universal to all teenagers—i.e., backtalking and challenging authority” in a
“cavalier” way and causing them “severe pain.” 143 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1126 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
While the plaintiffs prevailed on some of their constitutional claims, they lost their tort claims because of qualified immunity. Id. at 1158–59. Reflecting on the case, Jerri Katzerman, class counsel
for the plaintiffs and former Deputy Legal Director of the Southern Poverty Law Center, called the
tort claims and the legal battle over qualified immunity “kind of a pain.” E-mail from Jerri Katzerman, Deputy Legal Dir., S. Poverty Law Ctr., to Emily Suski, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ.
S.C. Sch. of Law (Jan. 12, 2017, 17:02 EST) (on file with author).
292. JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 12.07(1) (2016).
293. Id. § 12.07(4)(c).
294. Id. § 12.07(3).
295. Id. § 12.14(4)–(5).
296. Id. § 12.14(4)(b).
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nificant challenge because a school can argue that intentionally harming students by excessive discipline and assault are not within the scope of employment.297 However, even when the actions of the school staff are outside the
scope of employment, schools can still be held liable for negligent supervision. These negligent supervision claims require “standards of knowledge
[that] are significant and . . . a foreseeable risk of harm.”298 These requirements offer substantial defensive fodder to school districts that can doom
claims.299
Similarly, when children are hurt by other children or themselves in
school, schools can be held responsible for negligent supervision of the students.300 However, these claims also are far from sure winners. While the
school district does have a duty of reasonable care, it extends only to foreseeable risks of harm where increased supervision would have prevented the
harm.301 These constraints do not serve as a bar to every claim, but they can
prove a significant hurdle.302
C. Comparing the Responsibilities of Families and Schools for Harms
to Children
These Fourteenth Amendment, Title IX, bullying, and tort cases on their
own demonstrate the challenges that lie before children who seek to hold the
public schools responsible for harms they have suffered. Comparing the public schools’ lack of liability with the relative ease of imposing it on the family
sets this difficulty in stark relief. Schools are not held responsible for harms
to children in school, but families are held responsible for the same or less
severe harm. For example, in Domingo v. Kowalski and In re L.Z., both children had their cheeks squeezed by an adult.303 In Domingo, though, the
school faced no responsibility for the very same harm that caused the mother
to lose custody of her child permanently, even though she did not cause the
harm.304
297. E.g., John Doe 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of Greenport Union Free Sch. Dist., 955 N.Y.S.2d 600,
602 (N.Y. 2012) (noting school was not responsible in tort when a teacher’s aide engaged in a sexual
relationship with a student because, among other things, it was outside the scope of employment).
But see Booth v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 2009–1505 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/22/10); 49 So. 3d 919, 921–
22 (stating that school board could be liable for janitor’s assault of student).
298. RAPP, supra note 292, § 12.14(5)(b)(iii).
299. See supra notes 296–298 and accompanying text.
300. RAPP, supra note 292, § 12.12(2).
301. Id.
302. E.g., Conklin v. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 966 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(finding school district not liable for assault of plaintiff by another student where school knew fight
had been threatened because school engaged in some interventions with the students and could not
have anticipated the fight would nonetheless occur).
303. See supra notes 147–152, 205–210 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 147–152, 205–210 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, when family members do not impose the harm on children,
the family can still be held responsible for it, but when schools or school staff
do cause the harm, the school is not held responsible. In Greene v. Camreta,
Sarah Greene, who was not accused of any abuse or neglect, tried to mitigate
any potential harm to her children by cooperating fully in an investigation
into whether her husband abused her daughter.305 Yet she temporarily lost
custody of her daughter.306 By contrast, in T.W., the public school teacher,
Kathleen Garrett, caused such harm to T.W. that not only did his extant disabilities worsen, but he also developed a new psychological disorder.307 In
Doe, the way the school responded to the student sexual harassment exacerbated the harm to the student.308 In neither case, though, did the school bear
responsibility for the harm.309
Additionally, when families make efforts to address harm to children,
the family is still held responsible when the efforts were not fully effective,
but when school staff or administrators make half-hearted, ineffective efforts
to address harm to children, the schools are absolved of responsibility by virtue of those efforts. In In re Katie S., Katie S.’s sincere efforts to reunite with
her children were cut off prematurely, and her rights to her children were
permanently terminated.310 In In re N.P., the mother, M.P., lost custody of
her children, even though her ability to protect them from any harm resulting
from her husband’s domestic violence was hampered by that domestic violence.311 Conversely, in the Title IX cases Porto, J.F.K., and Bostic, the public schools either did nothing or nothing effective in the face of reports of
sexual harassment.312 Yet they faced no responsibility for the harm that resulted to the children in those cases.313
Finally, when families fail to protect their children from harm by another child in the family, the result can be liability, but schools are not held
responsible for such failures to protect children for harms by other children.
For example, in In Re Adam B., Alma B. lost custody of her older son, who
had a psychiatric disorder, because she could not always get him to take his
medication, and she lost custody of her younger son because she could not
protect him from her older son.314 Yet in the above-referenced sexual harassment cases, perhaps most egregiously J.F.K., where the school did very
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See supra notes 169–173 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169–173 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191–204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218–226 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191–204, 218–226 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161–168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228–236, 247–263 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228–236, 247–263 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153–160 and accompanying text.
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little to protect the student from the sexual advances and harassment of a
teacher, the school is not held responsible.315
With all that said, it must also be acknowledged that the child welfare
system, under which families are more easily held responsible for harms to
children, has a set of policy goals that are very different than those that underlie any individual claims a student might bring against a school for harms
suffered there. The child welfare system exists to protect children from future harm while claims against schools serve as remedies for past harms.316
So the imposition of responsibility on families may seem to serve child welfare policy goals in a way that holding schools as institutions responsible for
harms to children does not serve a remedial policy goal. That is, removing a
child from the home arguably is the best means of ensuring a child who has
been harmed by a family member will not be so harmed again because the
family member no longer has access to the child. In contrast, holding public
schools institutionally responsible for harms to children does not as obviously
serve as a remedy for past harms. Because the remedy for past harms is damages, it arguably does not matter who pays those damages—the school or the
individual perpetrator of the harm—as long as the damages get paid.
That argument, however, belies the practical and symbolic significance
of holding a school district responsible for past harms. On a practical level,
a school district simply may have more money than any individual, so recovery for past harms may be more likely if the school itself is responsible.
While that would without question be a draw on the public fisc, that is true
of any claim against a school, including claims for race discrimination. Further, the alternative to drawing on the public fisc is potentially denying children who have been harmed, abused even, a remedy when the individual defendant cannot pay.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, holding a school accountable
for harms suffered there sends a symbolic remedial message of accountability
on a system-wide level. It can also do more to remedy the harm than holding
only the individual who imposed it responsible, because it can force recognition and remediation of any system-level failures that contributed to the harm.
Arguably, that could, though, have the perverse effect of schools imposing
more stringent tactics and harsh discipline to guard against liability instead
of more meaningfully responding to harms. While a risk, that is far from the

315. See supra notes 228–236, 247–263 and accompanying text.
316. At the federal level, the Adoption and Safe Families Act prioritizes the “protection of children over the support of families.” Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and Punishment in the New
Age of Reprogenetics, 54 EMORY L.J. 1343, 1351 (2005).
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necessary outcome of liability. As police liability cases, among others, have
shown, liability can and often does lead to positive reforms.317
III. THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
That the public schools have notably less responsibility than families for
harms to children means that the public schools face far less scrutiny than
families for their decisions affecting whether children are harmed in their
care. This relative lack of scrutiny means the public schools not only enjoy
a measure of privacy but also more privacy than the family does in this respect. This public school privacy leaves children in school vulnerable to
harm. It is also not the only form public school privacy takes. Public school
privacy also takes the form of the private, traditionally deemed caretaking
activities that public schools do. To explain these privacies and the related
vulnerability it causes children in school, the concepts of privacy invoked
here warrant some description.
A. Privacy: Its Contours and Myths
The notion of privacy generally, as feminist scholars who have critiqued
it note, means a freedom from regulation and intrusion into decision-making.318 This freedom from regulation leaves the individual or entities autonomous and able to act without another questioning those acts.319 The concept
of privacy is situated in opposition to that which is public, or regulated by
outside authorities.320 Because in liberal political theory the concept of privacy is used to limit the government actions and intrusion on individuals and
individual decision-making, this notion of freedom from public intervention
317. E.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 861–65 (2001) (pointing out the “fault-fixing”
effects of police liability).
318. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 34 (“The conceptual demarcation between the public and private realms bolsters the idea that the state should not properly concern itself with caretaking and
human development.”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 294 (“I distinguish family or entity privacy
from constitutional or individual privacy. . . . Family privacy attaches to the entity of the family,
not to the individuals who compose it. Historically, this has meant that, in certain situations, the
doctrine operates to shield the family unit from state interference, even when the request for intervention comes from one of the family members.”).
319. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 19–20 (“[O]ur particular constitutional ordering also implies
that freedom from external rules and regulations generated by government is inherent in individual
autonomy. Autonomy is synonymous with a concept of self-governance, and is characterized by
self-sufficiency and independence, individual qualities that are seen as prerequisites for individual
freedom of will and action.”).
320. See id. at 150. Fineman describes the work of Olsen and others to expose the myth of the
public/private divide and notes that “public” has been thought of as that which is regulated and
“private” as unregulated. Id. Frances Olsen described “public” as potentially unconstitutional, but
“private” actions as not. Olsen, supra note 10, at 320–21. Private actions are shielded from such
regulation. Id.
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inherent in the concept of privacy typically means freedom from state regulation of individuals or entities.321
Privacy has another dimension as well. Privacy also means “personal
and domestic, as opposed to commercial; of the family rather than of the marketplace; home rather than work.”322 Frances Olsen described privacy in this
way more than thirty years ago, and the definitions still hold resonance and,
of course, relate closely to the notion of privacy that involves freedom from
regulation and intrusion.323

321. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 25 (discussing John Rawls’s conceptualization of privacy and
family, saying “he conceived of families as possessing an internal realm that is and should be left
immune from the power of the state, and which operates in some natural, pre-political way that
would be adulterated if the state were to intercede”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 296–97 (explaining
entity privacy as “[w]hat was shielded from state intervention and control was not only specific,
weighty, intimate decisions, such as the decision to beget or bear a child, but also mundane, day-today family interactions”); Dailey, supra note 10, at 968–69 (“The traditional history of this transition to the private family is mirrored in the rise of the constitutional doctrine of family privacy.
Although the family finds no express protection in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has established a strong tradition of constitutional protection for ‘the sanctity of the family’ under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has interpreted the constitutional guarantee of ‘liberty’ in that clause as recognizing a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.’ This constitutional connection between liberty and privacy derives from one of the central
tenets in liberal political theory: the distinction between the public and private spheres of human
life. Liberal theory conceives of the world as divided between the public sphere of state regulation
and the private sphere of individual freedom. Under liberalism, the state’s limited function ‘is to
guarantee to all individuals an equal opportunity for moral development and self-fulfillment.’ Although the state may act to safeguard the principles of individual autonomy and freedom, it must
nevertheless ‘refrain from intervention in the “private” lives of individuals and from imposing moral
values that would threaten individual autonomy.’” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); then quoting Prince v. Massachusetts
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); then quoting ALLISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN
NATURE 35 (1988); and then quoting id.)); Olsen, supra note 10, at 320 (“‘[P]rivacy’ may be invoked as a right which itself provides a substantive limit on state action permitted by the constitution.”).
322. Olsen, supra note 10, at 322. Exploring the definition of privacy to also discuss its critiques, Olsen writes, “The so-called first wave of American feminism in the nineteenth century
focused much attention upon women’s exclusion from public life, challenging the particular divide
between public and private life. . . . The so-called second wave of feminism is sometimes said to
have focused primary attention upon the public/private distinction.” Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
323. Indeed, as recently as 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court relied on these
notions of domestic, family, and personal privacy to support the notion that the right to marry includes the right of same-sex couples to marry. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). The Court explained,
Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are
among the most intimate that an individual can make. Indeed, the Court has noted it
would be contradictory “to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of
family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”
Id. (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)).
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1. Entity and Individual Privacy
Entities and individuals both enjoy privacy.324 Entity privacy is the notion that the guarantees of freedom from governmental intrusion inure not
just to individuals but also to certain spheres or zones.325 These zones include, for example, the home, where the state cannot search without certain
justification or a warrant.326 The family, significantly for the purposes here,
comprises another such sphere.327 In cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,328
the Supreme Court has been unequivocal about the existence of family entity
privacy.329 In Griswold, where the Court concluded married couples have a
right to contraceptives, it said that there exists a “private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.”330 In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court indicated that the privacy of families includes the privacy surrounding decisions
regarding the caretaking of children.331 There the Court said that the “custody, care and nurture” of children reside first in the parents and also that “in
recognition of this, . . . [the Court’s previous decisions, including Meyer v.
Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters] have respected the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter.”332
The notion of individual privacy is embedded in doctrine, including the
Bill of Rights, though none of the privacy rights are explicitly identified
324. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (recognizing zones of privacy
afforded entities, such as homes and the marital relationship). The Court explained:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. . . . The present case, then, concerns
a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.
Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. III).
325. Id.; see also FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 294 (“Family privacy is a common-law concept
that is not individualized, but founded on the nature of the protected relationship.”); Dailey, supra
note 10, at 972 (“With the recognition of parental rights in Meyer and Pierce, the Court brought the
domestic sphere within the protective scope of the Constitution, thereby establishing limits to the
power of the state to regulate within this sphere. The domestic sphere, like the economic marketplace, was ‘privatized’ in the sense that it, too, became a realm of negative liberty whose members
had a claim to freedom from state intervention.”).
326. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
327. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 59. Fineman notes that the family has been perceived as occupying a private sphere and embodying values and norms different than those entities in the public
sphere. This leads to legal doctrine that leaves families as entities shielded from scrutiny. Id.
328. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
329. Id. at 484 (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States as
protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
330. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J. concurring) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)).
331. 321 U.S. at 158.
332. Id. at 166.
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there.333 Instead, the Supreme Court has found that the constitutional rights
of privacy derive from “penumbras, formed by emanations from those [explicit] guarantees” in the Bill of Rights.334 Consequently, in cases like Eisenstadt v. Baird,335 the Supreme Court has found that the penumbral rights of
privacy guarantee specific individual freedoms such as, in that case, the individual right to access contraceptives.336 In Eisenstadt, the Court said, “[if]
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.”337 This individual right of privacy has also been extended to include,
for example, the right to abortion.338 In Roe v. Wade,339 the Supreme Court
concluded that this individual right to privacy is “broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”340 The Supreme Court has also identified caretaking roles as private. In Roe, the Court
identifies child-rearing activities and the education of children, all of which
involve caretaking, as private.341

333. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 18–19 (“The specific provisions of the Bill of Rights restrain
the government in regard to the individual, whose liberty and equality are thereby guaranteed.”);
see also Dailey, supra note 10, at 958 (“Constitutional protection for the family need not derive
solely, or even primarily, from a principle of negative liberty. Rather, constitutional protection of
the family ought to reflect an understanding of the family’s distinct role as a vital intermediate
institution serving the communal ends of political life. The family is deserving of constitutional
protection because of its essential role in creating and maintaining our broader political order. In
doctrinal terms, the Constitution should be read to prohibit state action that threatens to undermine
the family’s place in the political structure otherwise established by that document.” (footnote omitted)); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 57–58 (2006)
(“The liberal theories articulated by John Locke significantly influenced American statesmen of the
late-eighteenth century, and his ideas have been considered ‘the touchstone of all subsequent liberal
thought.’ Locke’s theory of liberal democracy espouses radical individualism and a concomitant
theory of the negative, limited state. These ideals together justify a state neutral about all but the
thinnest conceptions of the human good.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting BRIAN R. NELSON,
WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM SOCRATES TO THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 208 (2d ed. 1996))).
334. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516–22 (1961) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)).
335. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 453.
338. Questions exist about whether the right should be rooted in the right of privacy or the Equal
Protection Clause. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 295.
339. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
340. Id. at 153.
341. Id. at 152–53.

470

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:427

While the notions of family entity privacy and individual privacy are
related, Martha Fineman has pointed out that family entity privacy is conceptually and analytically distinct from the notions of individual privacy.342 Indeed, as Fineman notes, in Griswold the Court explains that family entity
privacy is “older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties,
older than our school system.”343 Recognizing the distinction between individual and entity privacy has significance, in part, because the privacy rights
of individuals can collide with those of the entities in which they function.344
2. Dismantling the Public/Private Divide and Piercing Family Entity
Privacy
As strong as these notions of privacy are in doctrine and history, feminist scholars have shown them to be constructs.345 In so identifying them,
342. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 295–96 (“The notion of the private family predates, and is
analytically separate from, the constitutional idea of individual privacy, although this new arena of
privacy seems rooted in older notions about family relations.”).
343. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
344. See FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 21 (“There is . . . [an] autonomy of individuals within the
family, for which feminists have fought by exposing domestic violence and child abuse. This way
of thinking about autonomy separates out individuals from the family unit and asks that their interests be considered separately and protected even against other members of that family unit.”); infra
Part IV.A.2.
345. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 5; FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 151–52. The myth that a stark
dichotomy exists between the public and the private finds a home in, among other places, contemporary political theory, and it has been adhered to by courts. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 17. As
Maxine Eichner notes in describing the ideas of political theorist John Rawls, “Some of the features
of Rawls’s theory . . . have set the agenda for contemporary liberal democratic theory—its focus on
justice defined in terms of liberty and equality, to the exclusion of other goods such as caretaking
and human development.” Id. at 17–18. As such, Eichner explains, “Rawls conceptualized a world
with a firm demarcation between the public and private realms,” with the family existing in the
wholly private realm and the state in the wholly public realm. Id. at 25. The family, in this view,
then assumes the caretaking role of children. Quoting Rawls, Eichner makes the point that under
this conception, “a central role of the family is to arrange in a reasonable and effective way the
raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral development and education into the wider
culture.” Id. at 23 (quoting John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
765, 788 (1997)). Eichner points out that these theories and this sharp demarcation between family
and state are evidenced in, for example, Title VII workplace sex discrimination and Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases. Id. at 30. Those cases, Eichner persuasively argues, mime the notion of a
public/private divide because the decision to have children is squarely a private, individual decision,
and the state has no obligation to support this decision by way of resources. Id. at 33. To underscore
this point, Eichner quotes from one such Supreme Court case, UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
where it states, “[d]ecisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who
conceive, bear, support and raise them.” Id. at 33–34 (quoting UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499
U.S. 187, 206 (1990)). Significantly, this view is espoused in a case that found a violation of Title
VII by the defendant company employer, Johnson Controls, for a policy that prohibited women
from working in certain jobs unless they had documented their infertility. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. at 191–92. Eichner does not argue the case should have come out differently, but she does
argue that Title VII forces a limited inquiry with its focus on justice and not also on caretaking
interests.
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feminists have exploded the myth that the divide between the private and the
public exists, particularly with respect to the family.346 If a line between the
public and private truly existed, then the family would not be regulated. Yet
the family is very much regulated.347 As Maxine Eichner has noted, government policies regulate how much control parents have over their children.348
For example, compulsory school attendance laws require parents to send their
children to school, with limited exceptions, regardless of whether parents
want to send their children to school.349 Family leave policies and child support laws affect how and the degree to which parents can care for their children physically and financially.350 And, as Anne Dailey has pointed out, laws
setting minimum ages to marry, regulating adoption, and establishing child
custody all serve to reinforce particular government policies regarding families and children, and they limit family autonomy and privacy.351 Child welfare laws too, of course, regulate the family.352 The family entity, then, is far
from private and autonomous.353
346. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 25 (“In today’s complex society, there is no way to separate
out any ‘natural’ function of the family that somehow stands apart from state action. Instead, how
families function is inextricably intertwined with both law and social policy.” (footnote omitted)
(first quoting Martha Minow, All in the Family and in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY 249 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997);
then citing Olsen, supra note 11, at 836)); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 151 (“Feminists have successfully deconstructed the public/private dichotomy in the context of the family.”).
347. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 55 (“The state is not only involved in determining what constitutes a family and when family relationships are dissolved, it is also involved directly and indirectly in a multitude of other ways.”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 151 (noting that the family is
“highly regulated and controlled by the state”).
348. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 55 (“And there are many other ways that state regulation and
public policy affect family life.”).
349. Table 5.1, supra note 39. As Eichner notes, the law also regulates families by,
reinforce[ing] parents’ authority over children by subjecting the children to court supervision should they disobey their parents; by preventing other adults from caring for them;
by allowing parents to have considerable power over whether children are institutionalized for mental-health reasons; and by child-labor laws that limit children’s ability to live
independently.
EICHNER, supra note 16, at 55.
350. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 56 (“The scope of family-leave laws affects parents’ opportunities to stay home with their children.”).
351. Dailey, supra note 10, at 998–99.
352. See supra Part III.A.
353. Dailey, supra note 10, at 997–98 (“Social and legal historians . . . assert that beneath the
ideology of family privacy lies a social and legal reality of family regulation. These theorists ask
why it is that, despite a rhetoric of family privacy, ‘public involvement in the family seems to have
grown substantially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’ Their inquiry, although tentative
and incomplete, is nevertheless rigorous enough to challenge two primary assumptions of the conventional theory: first, that the state is prohibited from interfering in family life; and second, that
the private sphere is confined to domestic affairs of no political or civil significance.”) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135,
1137). Feminists have exposed the myth of the public/private divide in other contexts too. They
have noted that “everything is public.” FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 150.
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Feminist scholars have not just dismantled the myth of a public/private
binary, but they have also pointed out the problems associated with this
myth.354 Among other things, it serves to perpetuate the exploitation of and
harm to women and children in the family.355 This myth does so by masking
and subordinating individual privacy rights of women and children to those
of the family entity.356 Regarding family privacy, Catharine MacKinnon has
stated, “[T]he measure of the intimacy has been the measure of the oppression.”357 MacKinnon has argued that family entity privacy allows for male
aggression and violence to be hidden.358 MacKinnon has been especially
concerned with the way family privacy has trampled women’s rights and
served to subordinate women.359 Family privacy, though, has also served to
support harm to children.360 To the extent the family is private and cannot be
intruded upon, then child abuse can happen.361 Exploding the myth of family
354. That said, all feminist scholars have not by any means denied the value of privacy. To the
contrary, even those who have critiqued notions of privacy, from Elizabeth Schneider to Martha
Fineman to Maxine Eichner, also have acknowledged its value. Elizabeth Schneider has called for
a more nuanced, affirmative embrace of notions of privacy that do not contribute to women’s subjugation. Schneider, supra note 11, at 974, 984–86. Martha Fineman has proposed rethinking
“privacy in such a way as to confer autonomy on caretaking or dependency units. The beneficiary
of this privacy is the unit, defined through its functioning, not its form.” Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1221 (1999). Maxine Eichner is explicit in stating that privacy deserves respect and sees the positive aspects of privacy for
families regarding, for example, health care decisions. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 63–65. Eichner also, though, calls for recognition of the role the state should play in supporting the family as
it cares for the dependency needs of others. Id. Michele Gilman has explained that feminists have
explored the need to “coerce privacy to retain liberal values” for women at the same time as they
need to recognize that privacy for some women, notably low-income women and women of color,
has been “stolen.” Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L. F. 1,
23 (2008).
355. EICHNER, supra note 16, at 34 (“[D]ependency . . . [has been seen as] properly confined
within families. . . . In this framework, we have far less difficulty conceiving of children as falling
within a parent’s personal sphere of autonomy—and thus allowing parents the right to be free of
interference in order to raise children as they see fit . . . .”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 152 (“[T]he
private sphere is the location of [women’s] domination and subordination.”).
356. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 299 (“[T]he idea of family privacy has been severely criticized
by feminists: children’s rights proponents; and others concerned with the potential for physical,
emotional, or psychological abuse of some family members by others. Family privacy has been
charged with obscuring and fostering inequality and exploitation.”).
357. MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 191.
358. Id. at 190 (“The liberal ideal of the private holds that, so long as the public does not interfere, autonomous individuals interact freely and equally. . . . Injuries arise through violation of the
private sphere, not within and by and because of it.”).
359. Id. at 190–91.
360. Fineman, supra note 354, at 1219 (“An additional source of criticism of traditional family
privacy are those who focus on the rights of children. The tradition, in this regard, protects parental
authority”). Therefore, harm to children can flow from the misuse of that authority. Id.
361. E.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 393, 417 (1996) (“The idea that any public involvement in child protection, education, health
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entity privacy paved the way for individual rights to be recognized within the
family, including the rights of women and children to be free from family
violence and harm.362
This work of feminist theorists has had practical effect. Breaking down
the myth of a divide between the private family and that which is deemed
public has served to better secure the individual rights of women and children. Highlighting the fallacies of the public/private divide has made way
for intrusions into the purportedly private sphere of the family once deemed
anathema.363 Domestic violence laws offer a prominent example of the effects of exposing the public/private divide as a mythical construct. Domestic
violence, once treated as a private family matter, now is a criminal act that
can result in state prosecution.364 In addition, although child abuse laws predate the work of feminist scholars, the notion that concepts of family privacy
supersede the family’s right to be free from harm is furthered by feminists’
work regarding the falsehoods and fallacies of family entity privacy.365 One
can question the state decision to intrude in a particular case of alleged child
abuse and the interventions the state applies to address suspected child abuse,
but the authority of the state to intervene in cases of suspected child abuse in
general is not questioned on the basis of family privacy.366
B. How the Public Schools Have Privacy
Taking these notions of privacy and the construct of the public/private
divide and applying them to the public schools reveals the ways that the public schools are private. It therefore also demonstrates that the notion that
and income support must inevitably erode the powers and unity of the family is not new . . . . The
myth remains powerful that the allocation of rights and responsibilities among children and parents
and the State is a zero sum game—with any gains for either children’s rights or the State’s interest
coming at the expense of the traditional family.”).
362. FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 21 (“[T]he autonomy of individuals within the family, for
which feminists have fought by exposing domestic violence and child abuse . . . asks that their interests be considered separately and protected even against other members of that family unit.”).
363. See Dailey, supra note 10, at 1016–17 (“At the same time that family privacy preserves a
loving refuge of individual freedom, it also shields domestic abuse and inequality from public redress. It was in recognition of this oppressive aspect of family privacy that the constitutional principle of individual autonomy pierced the domestic sphere.”); supra note 10 and accompanying text.
364. Dailey, supra note 10, at 1016–17; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON DOMESTIC &
SERIAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST POLICIES (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence1/Resources/statutorysummarycharts/2014%20Domestic%20Violence%20Arrest%20Policy%20Chart.authcheckdam.pdf (summarizing the domestic violence arrest laws in the fifty states and U.S. territories).
365. While domestic violence laws and child abuse laws represent steps forward in protecting
women and children from harm and exploitation, the systems are by no means free from problems.
Domestic violence laws certainly do not protect all women and can be misused. See supra note 180
and accompanying text. Child welfare systems suffer from endemic bias that affects low-income
families and families of color. See supra notes 145, 147 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 145, 147 and accompanying text.
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schools are strictly public is false, and so the public/private binary as it is
considered with respect to public schools is also false. Finally, recognizing
this false binary in the context of the public schools unmasks the problems
with it. Most particularly, it reveals that children are vulnerable to harm in
school.
1. Public Schools’ Privacy
Public schools are private in both of the senses developed above. First,
the public schools enjoy entity privacy because their decisions regarding
whether harm to children has occurred in school are largely unregulated.367
Second, the public schools are private in the sense that they are responsible
for caretaking tasks traditionally deemed domestic, or private.
To have entity privacy, a discrete sphere must be free from regulations
regarding some decisions or actions.368 Obviously, public schools are entities. As such, public schools are discrete spheres, like families, within which
decisions made could either be regulated or not. In this way, they are at least
theoretically capable of enjoying entity privacy. To the extent the public
schools’ decisions are unregulated, therefore, they enjoy entity privacy.
As the foregoing discussion of schools’ absence of responsibility for
harms to children in their care demonstrates, schools’ decisions that have an
impact on harms to children are largely unregulated. They, therefore, have
entity privacy with respect to those decisions. Admittedly, the courts do not
say that the schools’ decisions impacting harms to children in school are private, and therefore they will not hold them liable for the related, sometimes
resulting, harm that happens to children. Instead, the lack of regulation happens under the guise of pedagogical or disciplinary justifications for the
harm, as in the case of T.W. or Domingo.369 It also happens because courts
do not interfere with school decision-making as long as they do not do something clearly unreasonable in response to harms, as in student-on-student sexual harassment cases.370 In addition, this lack of regulation is justified because the public schools lack direct knowledge of the harm, as in teacher-onstudent sexual harassment, and excuse their decisions to do nothing in response to reasonable cause to suspect the harm.371 Finally, when bullying
occurs to students, the lack of regulation into school decision-making happens for all those reasons and because children have no actionable rights to
be free from bullying in school.372 No matter the stated reason, though, the
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 324–344 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192–210 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 214–233 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 240–263 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 265–290 and accompanying text.
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effect is still the same. Schools enjoy a lack of regulation and the privacy in
these cases by way of a lack of interference with, and responsibility for, decisions that affect whether a harm has occurred to a student in school.
The second aspect of schools’ privacy centers on schools’ responsibility
for caretaking tasks traditionally considered domestic and private.373 The Supreme Court has said that caretaking roles belong to the private family
realm.374 Yet it has also identified public schools as having these same
roles.375 As previously discussed, the public schools have a role in maintaining the health and safety of children.376 They have a role in teaching them
morals.377 So, the public schools have responsibility for these traditionally
deemed domestic, or private, activities, and this responsibility reveals another
dimension of their privacy. The public schools then have a double layer of
privacy. Their entity privacy protects them from scrutiny over these private
caretaking activities.
One counterargument to the notion that the public schools enjoy entity
privacy is that it simply overstates the matter. To be sure, the public schools
are very much regulated and, as such, are not private. State legislatures have
much control over the workings of the public schools, and Congress has
hardly been hands-off in its approach to education policy.378 The Supreme
Court also regulates schools when it accepts the call to decide the boundaries
of student rights in relation to school authority.379 Yet while public schools
operate under much regulation, they also have much discretion. Indeed, even
during the process of regulation through Supreme Court decisions, the Court
acknowledges the discretion the schools have.380 In this discretion is privacy.

373. See supra notes 322–323, 331–332 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 332–349 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part I.B.
376. See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text.
378. State legislatures regulate much of the workings of the public schools from their hours to
their curriculum. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Congress has passed comprehensive
education laws governing student testing, achievement, and the education of students with disabilities. For example, the Every Student Succeeds Act requires that states accepting federal money for
assistance educating disadvantaged students comply with certain evidenced-based curricular requirements as well as review requirements. 20 U.S.C. § 6303 (2012). Similarly, the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act requires states accepting federal assistance for the education of students with disabilities to comply with a detailed scheme with annual written planning for the needs
of each child with a disability as well as with specific comprehensive evaluation and disciplinary
protections. 20 U.S.C. § 1411, 1414 (2012).
379. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
380. For example, in Board. of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v.
Pico, the Supreme Court said, “[t]he Court has long recognized that local school boards have broad
discretion in the management of school affairs” but also went on to say, “[a]t the same time, however, we have necessarily recognized that the discretion of the States and local school boards in
matters of education must be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives
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Just as the notion that families have some degree of privacy does not negate
their regulation and thus public nature, the regulation of schools does not
negate their concomitant lack of regulation and entity privacy.381
Another critique of the argument that the public schools are private is
that individual privacy and family entity privacy is identified explicitly in
doctrine, but no doctrine has yet explicitly called the public schools “private.”382 This critique, however, elevates form over function. That courts do
not specifically call the public schools private does not mean that they are not
imbued with the features of privacy. No doctrine calls families public, but
they nonetheless are highly regulated.383 Similarly, where the public schools
have discretion and are unregulated, they have privacy.
A third possible critique is that although schools may do some of the
kinds of caretaking that families do, families ultimately bear the most responsibility for the care of children.384 So, any caretaking that schools do constitutes too little of the overall proportion of caretaking to make them private.
While it is true that families do more caretaking than schools, schools still do
caretaking. They therefore are still doing work traditionally deemed to be
within the private realm of the family.385
2. The Problems with Public Schools’ Privacy
As is the case with family entity privacy, public school entity privacy is
problematic. First, because schools are state entities, the limits to public
school liability mean that the state entity, as compared to the non-state entity,
has more privacy with respect to decisions affecting harms to children. Families will more easily face intrusion into or regulation of their decision-making that affects whether children are harmed than will the public schools.386
Family entity privacy has been broken down, then, in a way that public school
entity privacy has not. Public school entity privacy thus inverts perceived
norms about the relative privacy of the family as compared to the state.387

of the First Amendment.” 457 U.S. 853, 863–64 (1982). As a result, the Court invalidated the
decision of the school board in question to ban certain books from its libraries. Id. at 875.
381. As Frances Olsen noted, though focusing primarily on that deemed private, “all private
action can be made to look public and vice versa.” Olsen, supra note 10, at 322.
382. Entity privacy, however, is not called “entity” privacy by the Court. It is just “privacy.”
E.g., supra notes 329–330 and accompanying text. And, while the Supreme Court has identified
caretaking roles for the public schools of the sort traditionally deemed domestic and private, it has
never called those roles of the schools private. See supra notes 321–322, 330–331 and accompanying text; supra Section III.B.
383. See supra notes 345–353 and accompanying text.
384. See infra note 405 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 322–323, 331–332 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 303–336 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
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Second, public schools’ privacy subordinates the individual rights of
children to the privacy of the entity—the public schools. It reinforces the
principle that the public schools need discretion, or to be unregulated and
private, with respect to the decisions of the school about pedagogy or the
proper ways to respond to harms to children over the children themselves.
Moreover, it does so at times to such a degree that it undermines schools’
own roles and responsibilities. For example, when children are so harmed in
school that they miss significant amounts of school or drop out entirely, but
schools have made only half-hearted attempts to address or prevent the harm,
public schools’ entity privacy shields them from responsibility for not fulfilling their educational and caretaking roles.388 Public schools’ entity privacy not only protects their private caretaking decisions, as noted earlier, but
it also allows schools to abandon them entirely with little or no liability.389
IV. PIERCING PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ PRIVACY
Public schools can, therefore, evade responsibility for harms to children
in a variety of ways depending on the claim and even when such evasion
undermines their very roles and responsibilities.390 That raises a question
about whether some alternative claim could be developed and recognized by
courts that would work better to protect students. The recognition of schools’
privacy, particularly their caretaking functions, offers a way to develop such
a claim. It provides a theoretical basis for the development under the Fourteenth Amendment of an affirmative duty of schools to protect children from
harm and children’s right to be free from it. Thus, it provides a justification
for imposing responsibility on public schools for harms to children in their
care and rebalances the relationship between the privacy of schools and the
rights of children, such that those rights are not subordinate. Just as recognizing the false construct of family privacy created an avenue for ending the
subordination of the individual rights of women and children to be free from
family violence, so too can recognition of the false construct of the public
schools as fully public pave the way for recognizing children’s rights in
schools.

388. E.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the Morrow sisters withdrew
from public school and transferred to a private school as a result of the abuse they suffered); T.W.
ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining T.W. dropped
out of school as a result of his abuse).
389. See supra Part III.B.1.
390. See supra Part III.
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A. Dismantling the Public/Private Divide to Give Schools a Duty to
Protect and Children a Right to Be Free from Harm
Courts have long rejected the argument that the public schools have a
duty to protect children under the Fourteenth Amendment, although not always without reservation.391 The argument in support of the duty has been
grounded in an analogy between mandatory school attendance laws and state
confinement of adults in prisons and mental health facilities, where a state
duty to protect has been recognized because of the special relationship between the state and the confined individuals.392 Although these arguments
have not found success in the school context, recognition of the relevance of
public schools’ caretaking roles in the Fourteenth Amendment context offers
a new way to approach the claim and supports both a duty on the part of
schools to protect students and their corollary right to it.393
In the school context, courts have rested their consistent refusal to find
that schools have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect students on their
readings of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Estelle v. Gamble394 and Youngberg v. Romeo,395 where the Court found an affirmative state duty to protect
prisoners and involuntarily institutionalized persons, and Deshaney v. Winnegabo County Department of Social Services,396 where the Court found no
duty on the part of the state to protect an individual from acts of private citizens.397 In the former cases, the Supreme Court found the state had a special
relationship with the individuals giving rise to a duty to protect them because

391. For example, in T.K. v. New York City Department of Education, the federal district court
in New York considered the duty to protect argument in the bullying context. 779 F. Supp. 2d 289,
308 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Despite federal court decisions finding no such duty, it nonetheless said,
It is uncertain whether under the Due Process Clause, a public school has the duty to
protect an elementary school student from bullying where truancy laws are in effect. This
question need not be answered now since students have a right to be secure in school and
schools have a duty to prevent students from harassment under IDEA and Title IX.
Id.
392. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
393. At least seven federal courts of appeals have come to this conclusion. Patel v. Kent Sch.
Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a school had no duty to protect a student
with developmental disabilities from sexual encounters with another student in a bathroom, the
Court noted “[a]t least seven circuits have held that compulsory school attendance alone is insufficient to invoke the special-relationship” doctrine giving rise to a duty to protect). The courts specify
whether the duty to protect is a duty against harms from third parties or school staff to varying
degrees. Sometimes it is both, as in Graham v. Independent School District No. I-89, where the
allegation included that the school had a duty to protect under the Fourteenth Amendment against
actions of school staff and third parties. 22 F.3d 991, 993 (10th Cir. 1994).
394. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
395. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
396. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
397. Id. at 195.
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the state had restrained the liberty of the prisoners and institutionalized persons.398 In DeShaney, the court found no liberty restraint and, therefore, no
state duty to protect the individual—in that case, a child.399 Cases applying
these decisions in the school context have found that schools lack custody of
students—that is, they have not restrained them—and therefore have no special relationship with the students giving rise to a duty to protect them.400
The case of D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School401 is representative of these decisions.402 In that case, female students
brought an action against their school and the Penn Ridge, Pennsylvania
School District alleging a Fourteenth Amendment violation because fellow
students in a graphic arts class had repeatedly sexually, physically, and verbally assaulted them over a period of several months.403 In denying their
claims, the Third Circuit found the school did not have a special relationship
with the children, and therefore no duty existed under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect them from the harms they suffered.404 It outlined the meaning
of special relationship as one of physical restraint or custody.405 It went even
further and said that the “state’s duty to prisoners and involuntarily committed patients exists because of the full time severe and continuous state restriction of liberty in both environments.”406 While mandatory attendance
laws require children to attend schools, the court reasoned that they can at-

398. See supra notes 274, 277.
399. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200–01. DeShaney involved the case of a young boy who was
severely beaten by his father while in his custody, and the state, though aware of a history of abuse
by the father, did not protect him from that abuse. Id. at 191–93. In deciding the state had no
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect the child, the Supreme Court said:
[I]t is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own
behalf—through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty—which is the “deprivation of liberty” triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by
other means.
Id. at 200.
400. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
401. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
402. Id. The dissent in Middle Bucks strongly denounced the majority’s conclusion regarding
the Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect and its rationale, stating:
The majority’s restrictive view of the “special relationship” . . . is particularly troubling,
not only because it is based on the erroneous premise that its decision is compelled by
precedent but also because it is so sweeping that it is unlikely that any state-imposed
restraint of personal liberty short of incarceration or involuntary commitment will trigger
the duty to protect.
Id. at 1383 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1367 (majority opinion)).
403. Id. at 1366.
404. Id. at 1372.
405. Id. at 1370–71.
406. Id. at 1371.
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tend other schools, such as private schools, and so there is no physical custody—full time or otherwise.407 Thus, the public schools have not sufficiently restrained, or taken custody of, children to give rise to a duty to protect
them.
However, Middle Bucks and similarly decided cases fail for at least two
reasons. First, their conception of state restraint, or custody, belies the reality
and nuance of schools’ relationships with students. Because of mandatory
attendance laws, students in school fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum on which Estelle-Youngberg and DeShaney exist.408 To be sure, they
are not so fully restrained that they never leave the school setting, as is the
case with prisoners and institutionalized persons. They also, though, are not
fully able to forego school; the idea of school shopping is simply not a realistic option for the majority of students in public schools.409 As the dissent
in Middle Bucks points out, the “compulsory nature of public school attendance is not lessened by the fact that a few fortunate students have the option
to attend private school or be educated at home.”410
Second, and relatedly, these cases ignore the balancing test in the
Youngberg decision and the relevance of schools’ private, caretaking functions to that test.411 In deciding that the state owes a duty of care to involuntarily institutionalized persons, Youngberg declared that the state “may not
restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems
this necessary to assure such safety.”412 In other words, the Court concluded,
“that the nature of the restrictions on an individual’s liberty bear some relation to the State’s asserted purpose for restraining his liberty” and must be
balanced against it.413
In the school context, courts have not engaged with the idea that
schools’ authority must be balanced against obligations arising from the
state’s purpose for restraining them by requiring students to go to school.414
In failing to do so, they have also failed to acknowledge schools’ caretaking

407. Id.
408. Table 5.1, supra note 39; see also Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1383 (Sloviter, J., dissenting)
(stating “[t]here is no doubt that this case falls between DeShaney and Estelle/Youngberg”).
409. The majority of students in public school come from low-income families, who cannot
afford to send their children to private schools or to homeschool them. S. EDUC. FOUND.,
RESEARCH BULLETIN, A NEW MAJORITY: LOW INCOME STUDENTS NOW A MAJORITY IN THE
NATION’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2015), http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/4ac62e275260-47a5-9d02-14896ec3a531/A-New-Majority-2015-Update-Low-Income-Students-Now.aspx.
410. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1380 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
411. See Note, A Right to Learn? Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive Due
Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1335–37 (2007) [hereinafter Right to Learn?].
412. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
413. See Right to Learn?, supra note 411, at 1337.
414. See supra Part I.B.
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roles in the context of considering schools’ duties to students under the Fourteenth Amendment.415 The purpose of schools is to, among other things, educate students, teach them morals and behavioral norms, and guard their
safety in certain ways.416 If the public schools are not carrying out those
tasks, then they have restrained students’ liberty to no end and violated their
Fourteenth Amendment rights.417 When requiring students to attend school,
therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes at least a limited duty on
schools to protect against such harms that undermine these purposes. Protecting children in this way is also caretaking work. So, when a school fails
to protect students from harms that undermine their other caretaking work,
such as teaching students behavioral norms or guarding their health, then they
have violated the Fourteenth Amendment.418
The right of children to be free from harm should be a corollary to a
schools’ duty to protect children. If schools have a duty to protect children
from harms that undermine the purposes of school, then children should have
a right to be free from those harms in school as well. They have the right to
at least the most elemental form of protection: freedom from harm.
The development of this duty and this right can be critiqued in at least
two ways. First, it can be argued that the state’s role in requiring students to
attend school does not change the legal relationship between the school and
the students into a formal custodial relationship. While legal custody does
remain with the parent when children are in school, this critique ignores that
some form of physical custody—a limited form but one that nonetheless
gives rise to some duties—occurs when the state requires students to go to
school. Indeed, parents cannot assert full control over their children while
they are in school, as evidenced by, for example, school policies that limit
parents’ ability to physically access their children in school.419 When parents’ access is limited, their control and custody is changed in a very real,
415. Although, the Supreme Court has recognized these purposes in the context of affording
schools deference to suppress students’ rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. See supra
Part I.B.
416. See supra Part I.B.
417. An analogous argument has been made in the context of students’ right to an education
more generally. See Right to Learn?, supra note 411, at 1337. There, the argument was “if a state
restricts an individual’s liberty for the express purpose of educating that individual and then fails to
educate her, then the nature of the restraint bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the restraint, and due process is violated.” Id. Here, the argument is that schools’ duty to protect is
triggered not by a substantively inadequate education but by the schools’ failure to protect from
harms suffered in school that substantially harm or totally deprive children of the benefits of school.
These benefits include the caretaking work schools do in teaching students morals, instilling behavioral norms, and guarding their health and safety. When schools fail to protect children in those
ways, then they have restrained their liberty without much, or any, purpose.
418. See supra Part I.B.
419. For example, in California, parental visits to school must be coordinated through the school
principal. CAL. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, CSBA SAMPLE BOARD POLICY: VISITORS/OUTSIDERS (2012),
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practical way. Those changes, therefore, create obligations on the part of the
school to pick up the mantle of those limitations on custody.
Second, establishing both a duty to protect on the part of public schools
and the right of children to be free from harm in school may seem superfluous. Establishing the duty to protect alone might seem sufficient to give children an avenue for holding schools responsible on an institutional level when
harms occur in schools. However, if schools have a duty to protect children,
but children have no right to be free from harm, then the focus of any analysis
of harm to children in school will fail to focus on the children. In the current
analysis of any claim a child might bring against the school, the rights of
children are subordinate.420 Recognizing children’s rights more fully effects
the rebalancing between school entity privacy and children’s rights than
simply recognizing a duty of schools to protect children on its own would do.
B. A Framework for Analyzing the Duty and the Right
Arguing for courts to recognize a Fourteenth Amendment duty on the
part of public schools to protect children from harm and children’s right to
be free of it is one thing. Applying it is another matter. The application
requires a framework for analysis. That framework must start with the question of what the duty entails and the degrees of harm from which children
have a right to be free. Distinguishing the parental duty to protect their children from the “duty to protect” students during school is imperative.421 As
noted earlier, students in school fall into a relationship with the state that is
between that of children in the care of their parents and that of the inmates
and institutionalized persons in Estelle/Youngberg.422 As such, the schools’
http://www.csba.org/GovernanceAndPolicyResources/ConditionsOfChildren/SafeSupportiveSchlEnvironment/~/media/CSBA/Files/GovernanceResources/EducationIssues/ConditionsofChildren/SafeAndSupportive
SchoolEnv/SchoolSafetySampleBoardPolicies/AR1250VisitorsOutsiders.ashx.
Similarly, in
Texas, the Texas Education Agency states, “[t]here is no express right to visit a school.” Tex. Educ.
Agency,
General
Inquiry–General
Questions
FAQ,
http://tea.texas.gov/About_TEA/Contact_Us/General_Inquiry/General_Inquiry__General_Questions_FAQ/#visit.
420. See supra Part IV.B.2.
421. The family’s duty to protect its children has long been recognized. For example, in State
v. Williquette, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained this duty and its source. 385 N.W.2d 145
(Wis. 1986). In Williquette, a mother challenged charges of child abuse because she did not commit
the abuse. Id. at 148. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that persons who knowingly permit
the abuse of their children can be charged with child abuse. Id. at 147. To support this conclusion,
the court discussed the legal duty of parents to protect their children stating: “It is the right and duty
of parents . . . to protect their children, to care for them in sickness and in health, and to do whatever
may be necessary for their care, maintenance, and preservation.” Id. at 152 (quoting Cole v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 177 N.W. 2d 866, 869 (Wis. 1970)).
422. D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1384 (3d
Cir. 1992) (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Moreover, parental duty is fraught with complications, as it has
been enforced more with respect to women of color and low-income women than others. Michele
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duty to protect should be lesser than that of parents or the state when it completely restricts the liberty of prisoners and institutionalized persons. It
should be a duty to protect students while they are in school. Of course,
schools would have no obligation to protect students from, for example,
harms attendant to playing in the backyards of their homes.
In addition, this duty to protect is not against any and every harm a child
might suffer in school. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged,
the Fourteenth Amendment is not a “font of tort law.”423 Schools must protect students from significant harm, as opposed to lesser degrees of harm, to
prevent turning the Fourteenth Amendment into a font of tort law. Significant harm means harm more than the kinds of unintentional harm generally
attendant to school attendance. It means harm that deprives students of the
purpose for attending school—the kind of harm that results from intentional
or reckless acts, which cause more suffering than would result from the harms
generally attendant to school attendance. So, the harms in the case of T.W.,
for example, which included the exacerbation of disabilities and the development of new disabilities, would meet this standard.424 None of those harms
are of the sort that would be expected due to school attendance. They developed from intentional acts on the part of T.W.’s teacher.425 By contrast, in
Domingo, the teacher pinched the student’s cheeks. While doing so was intentional, that harm alone would not satisfy this standard if it only amounted
to bruising, which is the sort of harm that occurs in school regularly.426
In order to trigger the duty or to violate the rights of children, students
not only have to be in school, but schools also have to have knowledge the
harm is happening. More specifically, to trigger the duty, they must have a
reasonable cause to suspect the harm. It need not be direct knowledge. The
kinds of reports of harassment in Bostic v. Smyrna School District, for example, would suffice.427 There, the principal knew that the teacher, Smith, and
student, Bostic, were seen standing so close together in the school hallway
that it gave rise to suspicions about their relationship.428 The principal also

Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 495, 513–16 (2013). As such, it serves
as neither an ideal model nor a standard by which to develop a school duty to protect students under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment
of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1483–91 (2012).
423. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 476–77 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
424. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
425. Not only were the harms imposed on T.W. intentional, they reflected a possible sadistic
disorder. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 597 (11th Cir. 2010).
426. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
427. 418 F.3d 355, 357–58 (3d Cir. 2005).
428. Id.
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knew that Smith’s wife had found them alone together in her classroom, causing Smith’s wife to question the nature of their relationship.429 Such
knowledge gives rise to a reasonable cause to suspect harm might be happening to a child.
Finally, if schools act reasonably in response to notice of the harm, then
they will have complied with the duty and will not have violated children’s
rights. A reasonable response would be one calculated to address the cause
of the harm so that it will not continue. It need not be a perfect response.
This standard recognizes, therefore, that not all significant harm to children
can be prevented. So, if the school district in Bostic had removed the teacher
from any contact with the child and reported her to police for further investigation of the harassment reports, but the harassment continued, the school
would not be held liable.430 In that case, the public school would have taken
the steps possible to end the harassment.
Recognizing a duty of public schools to protect students from harm and
their right to be free from it will, even under the framework outlined here,
likely result in schools facing more liability for harms to children in their
care. This framework, however, seeks to allay at least some concerns attendant to such increases in liability by both using familiar touchstones such
as severe harm and notice and giving them depth by defining their meaning
in this context. Still, under this framework, schools will face more liability.
It will be, though, to the worthwhile end of reducing children’s vulnerability
to harm in school and privileging their rights over school privacy.
In sum, the schools should have a duty to protect against harm, meaning
significant harm, to children in school, and children have a right to be free
from harm. For schools to be liable for breaching their duty and violating
children’s rights in this context, the school must have knowledge of the harm,
or reasonable basis for suspecting the harm is happening. In addition, schools
must take reasonable steps to end the harm.
V. CONCLUSION
Just as exposing family privacy as a false construct was necessary for
the individual rights of women and children to gain protection within that
institution, so too does the privacy of the public schools need to be recognized
for children to be better protected from harm there. This Article has attempted to set forth ways in which the public schools enjoy privacy. Specifically, it has argued that because public schools’ decisions regarding harm to
children in school are largely unregulated, this lack of regulation makes

429. Id. at 358.
430. See supra notes 257–263 and accompanying text.
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schools private.431 They also are private in that they do caretaking, which is
work traditionally deemed domestic, or private.432 Finally, this Article contends that schools are more private than the family because families can more
easily be held responsible than public schools for harm to children in their
care.433 This privacy of the public schools not only exists, but it also privileges school authority over student rights—at times to the point of undermining the very purpose of school.434
Recognizing this privacy, particularly by understanding caretaking of
children as an element of it, however, also supports a theoretical argument
for a Fourteenth Amendment duty of public schools to protect children from
harm, and students’ corollary right to be free from harm in school.435 Establishing this duty and corollary right would accomplish multiple ends. It
would shift the balance in the current evaluation of children’s claims against
schools for harms suffered.436 It would also prioritize the rights of children,
so they are not subordinated to the privacy of the public schools.437
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